RTO-TR-071
AC/323(SAS-030)TP/35
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION
BP 25, 7 RUE ANCEL...
This page has been deliberately left blank
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RTO-TR-071
AC/323(SAS-030)TP/35
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION
BP 25, 7 RUE ANCEL...
The Research and Technology
Organisation (RTO) of NATO
RTO is the single focus in NATO for Defence Research and Technology...
Urban Operations in the Year 2020
(RTO TR-071 / SAS-030)
Executive Summary
1. Introduction
The NATO Research and Technolog...
enemy’s critical points, and remote strike assets to reduce the amount of close combat required or to control
information,...
It is further recommended that NATO should relate all future urban specific materiel developments to the 42
capabilities.
...
Op´erations en zone urbaine en l’an 2020
(RTO TR-071 / SAS-030)
Synth`ese
1. Introduction
Le rapport technique de 1999 sur...
seulement y faire face). Parmi les solutions envisag´ees, on peut citer l’utilisation de moyens de surveillance
interarm´e...
Il recommande aussi que l’OTAN mette en relation tout d´eveloppement futur de mat´eriel destin´e aux op´erations en
zone u...
Contents
Page
Executive Summary iii
Synth`ese vi
List of Figures and Tables xi
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background 1...
CHAPTER 5 – CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 21
5.1 Aim and Scope 21
5.2 Background 21
5.3 Operational Level Capability Requirement...
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 2-1 Population Growth 4
Figure 3-1 The USECT Construct 10
Figure 3-2 Illustration of Int...
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1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Asymmetric threats, emerging technologies and operations in urban areas have been ...
2
1.4 Study Group Approach
The Study Group adopted a staged approach. It began with an examination of the future operating...
3
CHAPTER 2
THE FUTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
2.1 Background
Since NATO’s inception in 1949 there have been no large scale oper...
4
There are undoubted benefits from this increased globalisation of world affairs but there are also unwanted
side effects...
5
2.3 Military Considerations for the Urban Environment
The Study Group considers that the following military consideratio...
6
developments. View 1 and View 2 operations are not likely to be easily and separately identified. It is more
likely that...
7
from the use or abuse of these limited resources. Urban areas are therefore likely to become the principal
arenas for th...
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9
CHAPTER 3
THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO URBAN OPERATIONS
3.1 Background
Traditional approaches to urban operations have be...
10
3.4 Conceptual Framework
Operations in urban areas demand a subtle blend of tempo, surprise, simultaneity and firepower...
11
3.5 The Use of USECT for Operations in Urban Areas
The manoeuvrist approach moves the focus from the traditionally pred...
12
Shaping will involve activity to isolate portions of the battle space. Isolation has both an external aspect (i.e.
of c...
13
Figure 3-2 llustration of Integrated Lines of Operations
However, there are limitations on the effects of firepower (li...
14
An exit strategy is usually thought of in terms of military redeployment. However until the local authorities
have esta...
15
CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
4.1 Aim and Scope
This Chapter identifies a range of operational concepts that could ena...
16
If the objective is the urban area itself in whole or in part, the missions could be to:
• Capture the urban area
• Def...
17
Local Politics, Economics, Culture
Opponent’s Capabilities, Political Will, Morale
Size,PhysicalType,
Infrastructure
Jo...
18
Isolation is aimed at denying an opponent any advantages of occupying the urban area. Dependent upon the
level of the o...
19
A ground assault concept involves forces entering urban areas. These could include frontal sweeps through the
area (whi...
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21
CHAPTER 5
CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Aim and Scope
Given the complexity and the challenges of operations in urban area...
22
NUMBER CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT
U 1 Process, format and distribute large scale data and information aimed at improving
th...
23
local populations and providing humanitarian assistance for others. In addition, a commander should plan to
operate wit...
Nato urban strategy
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Nato urban strategy

STRATEGIA_URBANA_NATO
Published on: Mar 3, 2016
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Transcripts - Nato urban strategy

  • 1. RTO-TR-071 AC/323(SAS-030)TP/35 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION BP 25, 7 RUE ANCELLE, F-92201 NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE CEDEX, FRANCE RTO TECHNICAL REPORT 71 Urban Operations in the Year 2020 (Op´erations en zone urbaine en l’an 2020) Report by the RTO Studies, Analysis and Simulation Panel Study Group SAS-030. Published April 2003 Distribution and Availability on Back Cover RTO-TR-071 © RTO/NATO 2003 Single copies of this publication or of a part of it may be made for individual use only. The approval of the RTA Information Management and Systems Branch is required for more than one copy to be made or an extract included in another publication. Requests to do so should be sent to the address above.
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  • 3. RTO-TR-071 AC/323(SAS-030)TP/35 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION BP 25, 7 RUE ANCELLE, F-92201 NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE CEDEX, FRANCE RTO TECHNICAL REPORT 71 Urban Operations in the Year 2020 (Op´erations en zone urbaine en l’an 2020) Report by the RTO Studies, Analysis and Simulation Panel Study Group SAS-030.
  • 4. The Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) of NATO RTO is the single focus in NATO for Defence Research and Technology activities. Its mission is to conduct and promote cooperative research and information exchange. The objective is to support the development and effective use of national defence research and technology and to meet the military needs of the Alliance, to maintain a technological lead, and to provide advice to NATO and national decision makers. The RTO performs its mission with the support of an extensive network of national experts. It also ensures effective coordination with other NATO bodies involved in R&T activities. RTO reports both to the Military Committee of NATO and to the Conference of National Armament Directors. It comprises a Research and Technology Board (RTB) as the highest level of national representation and the Research and Technology Agency (RTA), a dedicated staff with its headquarters in Neuilly, near Paris, France. In order to facilitate contacts with the military users and other NATO activities, a small part of the RTA staff is located in NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The Brussels staff also coordinates RTO’s cooperation with nations in Middle and Eastern Europe, to which RTO attaches particular importance especially as working together in the field of research is one of the more promising areas of initial cooperation. The total spectrum of R&T activities is covered by the following 7 bodies: • AVT Applied Vehicle Technology Panel • HFM Human Factors and Medicine Panel • IST Information Systems Technology Panel • NMSG NATO Modelling and Simulation Group • SAS Studies, Analysis and Simulation Panel • SCI Systems Concepts and Integration Panel • SET Sensors and Electronics Technology Panel These bodies are made up of national representatives as well as generally recognised ‘world class’ scientists. They also provide a communication link to military users and other NATO bodies. RTO’s scientific and technological work is carried out by Technical Teams, created for specific activities and with a specific duration. Such Technical Teams can organise workshops, symposia, field trials, lecture series and training courses. An important function of these Technical Teams is to ensure the continuity of the expert networks. RTO builds upon earlier cooperation in defence research and technology as set-up under the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and the Defence Research Group (DRG). AGARD and the DRG share common roots in that they were both established at the initiative of Dr Theodore von K´arm´an, a leading aerospace scientist, who early on recognised the importance of scientific support for the Allied Armed Forces. RTO is capitalising on these common roots in order to provide the Alliance and the NATO nations with a strong scientific and technological basis that will guarantee a solid base for the future. The content of this publication has been reproduced directly from material supplied by RTO or the authors. Published April 2003 Copyright  RTO/NATO 2003 All Rights Reserved ISBN 92-837-1100-9 Printed by St. Joseph Print Group Inc. (A St. Joseph Corporation Company) 1165 Kenaston Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1G 6S1 ii
  • 5. Urban Operations in the Year 2020 (RTO TR-071 / SAS-030) Executive Summary 1. Introduction The NATO Research and Technology Organisation’s 1999 Technical Report Land Operations in the Year 2020 (LO2020) concluded that in the future it is likely that NATO forces will have to conduct operations in urban areas, i.e. where physical structures, non-combatants and infrastructure will be significant characteristics. Furthermore LO2020 concluded that such operations will pose significant challenges for the Alliance. Present capabilities for operating in urban areas are essentially those of World War II, which are characterised by high levels of casualties and extensive collateral damage. Currently NATO commanders have very few military options which would avoid serious damage and casualties when dealing with an enemy in urban areas. Such effects are unacceptable, particularly at the lower levels of conflict, where NATO forces are more likely to become involved. Therefore, it is essential that NATO provides its commanders with a range of capabilities for dealing with the varying conditions of operations in urban areas. To follow up on these findings, SHAPE established a Military Application Study to examine the need for joint and combined doctrine and concepts for operations in urban areas. Seven NATO nations agreed to provide members for the Study Group, and the Studies, Analyses and Simulation (SAS) panel agreed in May 2000 that the UK should provide the Director. The Study Group examined the requirements of the SAS panel and prepared this Report for further consideration. The results are intended to identify directions for further research and to contribute to the NATO Defence Planning Process, the Defence Capabilities Initiative, and the Concept Development Experimentation Process. 2. Approach The Study Group adopted a staged approach. It began with an examination of the future urban environment. It then outlined an overall conceptual framework for urban operations and operating guidelines. This identified a number of desired operational level capabilities needed to conduct such operations successfully. These capabilities were themselves refined against further operational parameters then tested in a controlled Urban Seminar Wargame (USW) using two scenarios: one of a crisis response operation and the other a war fighting situation. Finally this led to the identification of mission needs/needed capabilities and a potential “roadmap” to address them. 3. The Future Urban Environment The Study Group began by outlining a description of the likely nature of the future urban environment. It observed that urban areas will continue to increase in number and size and are likely to become focal points for unrest and conflict. The physical and human complexity of this environment presents unique challenges for a NATO commander which are not adequately addressed by those military capabilities designed for open environments. 4. The Manoeuvrist Approach to Urban Operations The Study Group then identified an emerging overarching approach to urban operations that holds the promise of leading to significantly improved capabilities. The more traditional approaches to improving urban capabilities are focused at the tactical, single-Service level. These aim to help tactical forces better cope with the conditions of uncertainty, close proximity to the enemy and vulnerability that characterise tactical engagements. Initiatives include improved personal protection, wall breaching techniques, etc. Emerging doctrinal approaches could enable a NATO commander to employ manoeuvre at the operational level in an urban environment in order to “Shape” (not just cope with) the conditions of the tactical fight. Initiatives include the use of joint surveillance assets to better focus the tactical engagements against the iii
  • 6. enemy’s critical points, and remote strike assets to reduce the amount of close combat required or to control information, mobility and the support available to the enemy’s tactical forces. “USECT” is a conceptual framework that can be used to describe the manoeuvrist approach. (This framework was first introduced by the US in a doctrinal publication dealing with joint operations in an urban environment.1 It stands for Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate, and Transition. These components can be employed separately, sequentially or simultaneously. The traditional approach to urban operations lacks the ability to gain information and knowledge regarding enemy locations, movements and status in an urban environment. Tactical information is frequently gained only when an enemy has been engaged, emphasising the “Engage” portion of the framework. This generally results in the application of overwhelming force to defeat an enemy. In contrast, the manoeuvrist approach seeks to “Understand” the nature of the enemy, his locations and intentions before engagement by employing ISTAR and other assets, and to use the information gained to “Shape” the urban battlespace. This emphasises the “Understand” portion of the framework, and will allow a NATO Commander to employ a manoeuvrist approach at the operational level to “Shape” the tactical combat actions to advantage and “Engage” an enemy with precision effects, thereby reducing casualties and collateral damage. Since tactical engagements will continue for the foreseeable future, a co-ordinated programme including both tactical and operational-level improvements is needed. Initiatives at the operational level, however, hold the promise of dramatic improvement. Recommendation The Study Group recommends NATO adopt the USECT framework as the basis for all further development of concepts and doctrine for urban operations 5. Operational Concepts In order to achieve an overall manoeuvrist approach, a NATO commander has to have improved capabilities to Understand, Shape, and Engage in an urban environment. In order to identify and develop these capabilities, the Study Group first reviewed the full range of urban missions and identified operational concepts that a NATO commander might employ to conduct each mission successfully. These concepts are of two types: a traditional type in which the ability to “Understand” within an urban area is very limited (siege, destruction, frontal assault), and an emerging type in which improved doctrine and capabilities are utilised to Understand, Shape, and Engage with precision effects within the battlespace (precision strike, nodal isolation and capture, segment and capture, etc.) Recommendation The Study Group recommends that NATO adopt the mission types and emerging operational concepts identified as the basis for further study, investigation and experiment. 6. Capability Requirements The capabilities required by each operational concept were identified by the Study Group and presented using the USECT framework. The “Capabilities Assessment Seminar” (CAPS) held in September 2001 resulted in a consolidated list of 42 operational-level capabilities (recorded in Chapter 5.) All of these capabilities would be necessary for a NATO commander to conduct successfully operations in an urban environment. To allow a more detailed examination of the most important capabilities, only 15 were designated as “key capabilities.” Two principal criteria used for this selection were: military significance and the extent of the capability gap, as judged by the Study Group. Recommendations The Study Group recommends that NATO develop capabilities for use in urban areas by focussing on the key requirements identified in this study. It is also recommended that all the 42 capabilities identified merit further examination but that the initial focus should be on the 15 key capabilities. 1 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Staff. Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. Joint Publication -3-06. 2nd Draft, October, 2000 iv
  • 7. It is further recommended that NATO should relate all future urban specific materiel developments to the 42 capabilities. 7. Potential Solutions The final part of the study was to determine actions that could develop the key capabilities. These actions were classified into the types of initiatives that might be taken and were separated into four categories: Doctrine, Organisation, Training and Materiel. Although more than half of the capabilities were driven by Materiel, a significant number had drivers in the areas of Doctrine, Organisation and Training. To gain further insight into the nature of potential solutions, an Urban Seminar Wargame (USW) was conducted by the Study Group in November 2001. For this activity twelve “System Concepts” were identified that could provide the required capabilities. Specific representative systems were then examined in the Wargame and their military attractiveness, technical attractiveness, technical risk and research cost were assessed by the Study Group. Three different vignettes were considered in this process. Both the CAPS and USW assessments show that the essential capabilities are to collect, communicate, process, fuse, assimilate, and distribute information from many different sources, especially HUMINT, in a responsive manner. The sensors and platforms that support these capabilities emerged as the most valued by USW participants. The ability to exploit effectively the information gained to “Shape” and “Engage” also received high priority. Key systems included unmanned vehicles and non-lethal weapons to reduce casualties, and precision delivery to limit collateral damage. Recommendations The Study Group recommends that NATO should focus on potential solutions for enhanced capabilities in urban areas at the operational level of command. It is also recommended that NATO give priority to Concept Development and Experimentation in order to determine potential solutions across all aspects of Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF). This should include: • Identifying those modelling and simulation requirements for operational analysis and training. • Addressing policy implications for issues such as the employment and use of NLW, unmanned systems/robots, cyber ops, etc. • Promoting interoperability. 8. Principal Recommendations The Study Group recommends that: • The operational concepts, capability requirements and potential solutions offered in this Study should be expended and further investigated using the USECT framework. This should include concept development and experimentation. This should also consider modelling and simulation tools to support the process. • The capabilities described in this study, and solutions developed are reflected in NATO’s Defence Planning Process as Long Term Requirements. • NATO should establish a Branch level lead within SHAPE to provide oversight and be the focal point for future urban activities. • Points of Contact should be nominated in other appropriate HQs and offices to co-ordinate urban related efforts. • NATO should establish an Urban Operations Working Group with a lead nation2 to serve as a focal point in support of SHAPE, to co-ordinate NATO and member nations’ urban related efforts and to build a plan based upon directions identified in this study. Finally the Study Group recommends that RTB should endorse this study and its recommendations and forward them to the Military Committee, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and the Strategic Commands. 2 In May 2002 Germany and the Netherlands indicated a willingness to provide this lead. v
  • 8. Op´erations en zone urbaine en l’an 2020 (RTO TR-071 / SAS-030) Synth`ese 1. Introduction Le rapport technique de 1999 sur les op´erations terrestres en l’an 2020 (LO 2020), ´etabli par l’Organisation OTAN pour la recherche et la technique, concluait qu’`a l’avenir, l’OTAN devrait vraisemblablement mener des op´erations dans des zones urbaines, o`u les am´enagements et les infrastructures ainsi que la pr´esence de non-combattants seront des caract´eristiques importantes `a prendre en compte. Le rapport pr´ecisait en outre que ce type d’op´erations constituerait un d´efi majeur pour l’Alliance. En effet, les moyens actuellement disponibles pour des op´erations en zone urbaine sont essentiellement ceux de la deuxi`eme guerre mondiale et se caract´erisent par des pertes ´elev´ees et des dommages collat´eraux ´etendus. Aujourd’hui, les commandants OTAN disposent d’un nombre tr`es limit´e d’options militaires leur permettant d’´eviter des dommages et des pertes trop importantes lorsqu’ils interviennent en zone urbaine face `a un ennemi. De tels effets sont inacceptables, surtout aux premiers stades d’un conflit, o`u la probabilit´e d’une implication des forces de l’OTAN est plus ´elev´ee. Il est donc essentiel que l’OTAN mette `a la disposition de ses commandants un ´eventail de moyens leur permettant de s’adapter aux conditions changeantes des op´erations en zone urbaine. Suite `a ces conclusions, le SHAPE a lanc´e une ´etude en vue d’applications militaires afin d’´evaluer la n´ecessit´e de doctrines et de concepts conjoints et combin´es pour les op´erations en zone urbaine. Sept pays de l’OTAN ont accept´e de d´esigner des membres pour former le groupe de travail; la commission SAS (Etudes, analyse et simulation) a d´ecid´e pour sa part, en mai 2000, que le Royaume-Uni fournirait le directeur. Le groupe d’´etude a ´etudi´e les besoins recens´es par la commission SAS et a ´etabli le pr´esent rapport en vue d’un examen compl´ementaire. Les r´esultats de ce travail doivent permettre de d´efinir des orientations pour les futures activit´es de recherche et d’apporter une contribution au processus d’´etablissement des plans de d´efense de l’OTAN, `a l’initiative sur les capacit´es de d´efense et au processus de d´eveloppement et d’exp´erimentation de concepts. 2. Approche Le groupe d’´etude a adopt´e une approche comportant plusieurs ´etapes. Il a tout d’abord analys´e le futur environnement urbain. Il a ensuite d´efini un cadre conceptuel g´en´eral pour les op´erations urbaines ainsi que des lignes directrices pour l’action `a mener. Le groupe a recens´e un certain nombre de capacit´es op´erationnelles souhait´ees qui sont n´ecessaires au succ`es de telles op´erations. Ces capacit´es ont ensuite ´et´e d´efinies plus pr´ecis´ement en fonction d’autres param`etres op´erationnels avant d’ˆetre mises `a l’essai dans le cadre d’une simulation contrˆol´ee de combat en zone urbaine au moyen de deux sc´enarios portant respectivement sur une op´eration de r´eponse `a une crise et sur une situation de combat. Ce travail a permis d’identifier les besoins relatifs `a la mission et les capacit´es requises ainsi que d’´etablir un « plan de marche » possible en vue d’apporter les solutions. 3. Le futur environnement urbain Le groupe d’´etude a d’abord entrepris de d´ecrire la nature probable du futur environnement urbain. Il a not´e que le nombre et la taille des zones urbaines vont continuer d’augmenter et que ces zones pourraient devenir des foyers de troubles et de conflits. La complexit´e mat´erielle et humaine de cet environnement fait que les commandants de forces OTAN sont confront´es `a des d´efis in´edits auxquels les capacit´es militaires con¸cues pour des environnements « ouverts » ne permettent pas de r´epondre de mani`ere ad´equate. 4. L’approche manœuvri`ere des op´erations en zone urbaine Le groupe d’´etude a mis en ´evidence une approche globale nouvelle des op´erations en zone urbaine qui permettrait d’am´eliorer notablement les capacit´es dans ce domaine. Les approches plus traditionnelles visant `a am´eliorer les capacit´es utilis´ees en zone urbaine privil´egient l’´echelon tactique et ne concernent qu’une seule arme. Leur but est d’aider les forces tactiques `a mieux r´eagir face aux conditions qui caract´erisent le combat tactique, `a savoir l’incertitude, la proximit´e imm´ediate de l’ennemi et la vuln´erabilit´e. Les nouvelles perspectives concernent l’am´elioration de la protection individuelle, les techniques d’ouverture de br`eches, etc. Grˆace aux nouvelles approches doctrinales, un commandant OTAN pourrait employer les forces de manœuvre `a l’´echelon op´erationnel dans un environnement urbain pour « modeler » les conditions du combat tactique (et non pas vi
  • 9. seulement y faire face). Parmi les solutions envisag´ees, on peut citer l’utilisation de moyens de surveillance interarm´ees afin de mieux diriger les actions tactiques sur les points n´evralgiques de l’ennemi et l’emploi de moyens de frappe `a distance afin de limiter le recours au combat rapproch´e ou de contrˆoler l’information, la mobilit´e ainsi que le soutien dont disposent les forces tactiques de l’ennemi. Le concept am´ericain d’USECT peut ˆetre utilis´e pour d´ecrire l’approche manœuvri`ere. (Ce concept, n´e aux Etats-Unis, est apparu pour la premi`ere fois dans une publication sur la doctrine traitant des op´erations en zone urbaine1 . USECT, pour « Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate and Transition », consiste `a « comprendre », « modeler », « prendre `a partie », « faire la synth`ese des informations » et « assurer la transition ». Ces aspects peuvent ˆetre utilis´es s´epar´ement, successivement ou simultan´ement. L’approche traditionnelle des op´erations en zone urbaine ne prend pas en compte la capacit´e de recueillir des informations et des donn´ees sur les positions, les mouvements et l’´etat des forces ennemies dans un environnement urbain. Bien souvent, les informations tactiques ne sont recueillies qu’apr`es la prise `a partie d’un ennemi, l’accent ´etant alors mis sur la phase correspondante du concept. C’est ainsi que, pour mettre l’ennemi en ´echec, on a g´en´eralement recours `a des forces beaucoup trop importantes. A l’oppos´e, l’approche manœuvri`ere consiste `a « comprendre » la nature de l’ennemi, ses positions et ses intentions avant de le prendre `a partie en utilisant la capacit´e ISTAR et d’autres moyens et `a exploiter les informations recueillies pour « modeler » l’environnement de combat urbain. Ces activit´es, r´eunies sous le concept USECT, permettront `a un commandant OTAN d’utiliser une approche manœuvri`ere `a l’´echelon op´erationnel pour « modeler » les aspects du combat tactique en les tournant `a son avantage et « prendre `a partie » l’ennemi avec des armes de pr´ecision, r´eduisant ainsi les pertes et les dommages collat´eraux. Dans la mesure o`u, dans un avenir proche, les actions tactiques vont se poursuivre, il faut mettre sur pied un programme d’am´eliorations `a l’´echelon tactique et `a l’´echelon op´erationnel. Les nouvelles perspectives qui se dessinent `a l’´echelon op´erationnel devraient amener une am´elioration spectaculaire. Recommandation Le groupe d’´etude recommande que l’OTAN adopte le concept USECT comme base pour l’´elaboration ult´erieure des concepts et de la doctrine applicables aux op´erations en zone urbaine. 5. Concepts op´erationnels Afin de mettre en œuvre une approche manœuvri`ere globale, un commandant OTAN doit avoir `a sa disposition des capacit´es am´elior´ees lui permettant de « comprendre », de « modeler » l’environnement et de « prendre `a partie » l’ennemi dans un environnement urbain. Dans le but de recenser et de d´evelopper ces capacit´es, le groupe d’´etude a tout d’abord pass´e en revue la gamme compl`ete des missions en zone urbaine et d´efini des concepts op´erationnels qu’un commandant OTAN pourrait appliquer pour que chaque mission soit une r´eussite. Ces concepts sont de deux types : l’un, traditionnel, dans lequel l’aptitude `a « comprendre » l’environnement urbain est tr`es limit´ee (si`ege, destruction, attaque frontale) et l’autre, nouveau, dans lequel l’am´elioration de la doctrine et des capacit´es est mise `a profit pour « comprendre » et « modeler » l’environnement et « prendre `a partie » l’ennemi en utilisant des armes de pr´ecision dans l’espace de combat (frappe de pr´ecision, isolement et prise de centres nodaux, segmentation et prise, etc.). Recommandation Le groupe d’´etude recommande que l’OTAN adopte les types de mission et les nouveaux concepts op´erationnels ainsi d´efinis pour qu’ils servent de base aux ´etudes, aux recherches et aux exp´eriences futures. 6. Capacit´es requises Les capacit´es n´ecessaires `a chaque concept op´erationnel ont ´et´e recens´ees par le groupe d’´etude et pr´esent´ees dans le cadre du concept USECT. Le s´eminaire sur l’´evaluation des capacit´es (CAPS) tenu en septembre 2001 a permis d’´etablir une liste de 42 capacit´es de niveau op´erationnel (chapitre 5). Un commandant OTAN devrait pouvoir disposer de l’ensemble de ces capacit´es pour mener `a bien des op´erations dans un environnement urbain. Afin de permettre un examen plus d´etaill´e des principales capacit´es, quinze « capacit´es essentielles » ont ´et´e d´efinies sur la base de deux grands crit`eres : l’importance sur le plan militaire et l’ampleur des lacunes, selon l’avis du groupe d’´etude. Recommandations Le groupe d’´etude recommande que l’OTAN d´eveloppe des capacit´es `a utiliser dans des zones urbaines en se concentrant sur les besoins essentiels mis en ´evidence dans la pr´esente ´etude. Il recommande en outre que les 42 capacit´es recens´ees soient analys´ees plus avant, mais que l’accent soit mis dans un premier temps sur les 15 capacit´es essentielles. 1 U.S. Department of Defense. Etat-major interarm´ees. Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. Publication interalli´ee-3-06. 2e version, octobre 2000 vii
  • 10. Il recommande aussi que l’OTAN mette en relation tout d´eveloppement futur de mat´eriel destin´e aux op´erations en zone urbaine avec les 42 capacit´es recens´ees. 7. Solutions possibles La derni`ere partie de l’´etude est consacr´ee aux mesures permettant de d´evelopper les capacit´es essentielles. Ces mesures sont group´ees en fonction des types d’initiatives qui pourraient ˆetre prises et rang´ees dans quatre cat´egories : doctrine, organisation, entraˆınement et mat´eriel. Plus de la moiti´e des capacit´es sont li´ees au mat´eriel, mais nombreuses sont celles qui d´ependent aussi de la doctrine, de l’organisation et de l’entraˆınement. Afin de mieux connaˆıtre la nature des solutions possibles, le groupe d’´etude a organis´e en novembre 2001 un s´eminaire sur la simulation d’op´erations en zone urbaine (USW). Dans ce but, douze « concepts de syst`emes » pouvant fournir les capacit´es requises ont ´et´e r´epertori´es. Le groupe d’´etude a ensuite analys´e diff´erents syst`emes repr´esentatifs lors de la simulation et a ´evalu´e leur int´erˆet sur le plan militaire et sur le plan technique, le risque technique qu’ils pr´esentent et le coˆut de la recherche associ´ee. Trois « vignettes » diff´erentes ont ´et´e ´etudi´ees dans le cadre de ce travail. Les ´evaluations men´ees lors des s´eminaires CAPS et USW montrent que les capacit´es essentielles consistent `a recueillir, communiquer, traiter, fusionner, assimiler et distribuer, de mani`ere adapt´ee, des informations provenant de sources multiples, notamment le renseignement humain. Selon les participants au s´eminaire USW, les capteurs et les plates-formes `a l’appui de ces capacit´es pr´esentent le plus grand int´erˆet. L’aptitude `a exploiter efficacement les informations recueillies lors des phases « modeler » et « prendre `a partie » a ´egalement ´et´e jug´ee hautement prioritaire. Parmi les principaux syst`emes consid´er´es, on peut citer les v´ehicules sans pilote et les armes non l´etales, qui permettent de r´eduire les pertes, ainsi que les dispositifs de largage de pr´ecision, dont le but est de limiter les dommages collat´eraux. Recommandations Le groupe d’´etude recommande que l’OTAN mette l’accent sur la recherche de solutions permettant d’am´eliorer les capacit´es pour les op´erations en zone urbaine `a l’´echelon du commandement op´erationnel. Il recommande aussi que l’OTAN donne la priorit´e `a l’´elaboration et `a l’exp´erimentation de concepts afin de d´efinir des solutions possibles pour tous les aspects concernant la doctrine, l’organisation, l’entraˆınement, le mat´eriel, le commandement, le personnel et les installations (DOTMLPF). Ces tˆaches devraient notamment consister `a : • recenser les besoins de mod´elisation et de simulation en ce qui concerne l’analyse op´erationnelle et l’entraˆınement; • ´etudier les incidences sur le plan de l’action dans des domaines tels que l’emploi des armes non l´etales, des syst`emes sans pilote/robotis´es, les op´erations de guerre ´electronique, etc. • favoriser l’interop´erabilit´e. 8. Recommandations principales Le Groupe d’´etude fait les recommandations suivantes : • Les concepts op´erationnels, les capacit´es requises et les solutions possibles qui sont propos´es dans la pr´esente ´etude devraient ˆetre d´evelopp´es et analys´es plus avant en utilisant le concept USECT. Cela devrait donner lieu notamment `a un travail de d´eveloppement et d’exp´erimentation. Il conviendrait aussi d’envisager l’emploi d’outils de mod´elisation et de simulation `a l’appui de ce processus. • Les capacit´es d´ecrites dans la pr´esente ´etude et les solutions propos´ees sont reprises en tant que besoins `a long terme dans le processus d’´etablissement des plans de d´efense de l’OTAN. • L’OTAN devrait mettre en place, au sein d’un service du SHAPE, une « Branche » ayant une mission de contrˆole et servant de point focal pour les activit´es qui seront men´ees en zone urbaine. • Des points de contact devront ˆetre d´esign´es dans d’autres QG et services concern´es en vue de coordonner les activit´es en rapport avec les op´erations en zone urbaine. • L’OTAN devrait cr´eer un groupe de travail sur les op´erations en zone urbaine qui, sous la direction d’un pays pilote2 , servirait de point focal `a l’appui du SHAPE et serait charg´e de coordonner les activit´es de l’OTAN et des pays membres concernant les op´erations en zone urbaine et d’´elaborer un programme de travail en se fondant sur les orientations d´efinies dans la pr´esente ´etude. Enfin, le groupe d’´etude recommande que le RTB ent´erine la pr´esente ´etude et les recommandations qui y sont formul´ees et les transmette au Comit´e militaire, `a la Conf´erence des Directeurs nationaux des armements (CDNA) et aux commandements strat´egiques. 2 En mai 2002, l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas ont fait savoir qu’ils ´etaient dispos´es `a jouer le rˆole de pays pilotes. viii
  • 11. Contents Page Executive Summary iii Synth`ese vi List of Figures and Tables xi CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Purpose 1 1.3 Objectives 1 1.4 Study Group Approach 2 1.5 Definition of Urban Operations 2 CHAPTER 2 – THE FUTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 3 2.1 Background 3 2.2 The Urban Environment 3 2.3 Military Considerations for the Urban Environment 5 2.4 Conclusions 6 CHAPTER 3 – THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO URBAN OPERATIONS 9 3.1 Background 9 3.2 Scope 9 3.3 The Manoeuvrist Approach 9 3.4 Conceptual Framework 10 3.5 The Use of USECT for Operations in Urban Areas 11 3.6 Application of the USECT Framework 14 3.7 Conclusions 14 3.8 Recommendations 14 CHAPTER 4 – OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 15 4.1 Aim and Scope 15 4.2 Guidelines for Urban Operational Concepts 15 4.3 Missions in Urban Areas 15 4.4 Assessing a Mission in an Urban Area 16 4.5 Operational Concepts 17 4.6 Operational Capabilities Needed to Enable the Concepts 19 4.7 Conclusions 19 4.8 Recommendations 19 ix Click inside the blue boxes to view the corresponding section
  • 12. CHAPTER 5 – CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 21 5.1 Aim and Scope 21 5.2 Background 21 5.3 Operational Level Capability Requirements 21 5.4 Key Operational Level Capabilities 24 5.5 Conclusions 25 5.6 Recommendations 25 CHAPTER 6 – IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 27 6.1 Aim and Scope 27 6.2 A Description of DOTMLPF 27 6.3 Application of DOTMLPF 27 6.4 General Indications 29 6.5 Conclusions 35 6.6 Recommendations 36 CHAPTER 7 – URBAN OPERATIONS ROADMAP 37 7.1 Introduction 37 7.2 Direction and Implementation Requirements 37 7.3 Linked National Activity 38 7.4 Conclusions 39 7.5 Recommendations 40 LIST OF ACRONYMS 41 ANNEX A – LIST OF MEMBERS / LISTE DES MEMBRES A-1 ANNEX B – METHODOLOGY B-1 ANNEX C – CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT SEMINAR C-1 ANNEX D – URBAN SEMINAR WARGAME D-1 ANNEX E – SCENARIOS AND VIGNETTES E-1 ANNEX F – TERMS OF REFERENCE F-1 x
  • 13. List of Figures and Tables Figure 2-1 Population Growth 4 Figure 3-1 The USECT Construct 10 Figure 3-2 Illustration of Integrated Lines of Operations 13 Figure 4-1 Example of Changing Conditions Affecting Urban Capabilities 17 Figure 4-2 Some Types of Operational Concepts: Capture the Urban Area 18 Figure 6-1 Relative Proportion of Drivers for 15 Key Capabilities 29 Figure 6-2 Relative Proportion of Drivers for 42 Capabilities 29 Figure 7-1 Roadmap 39 Table 5-1 Understand Capabilities 22 Table 5-2 Shape Capabilities 22 Table 5-3 Engage Capabilities 23 Table 5-4 Consolidate Capabilities 23 Table 5-5 Transition Capabilities 23 Table 5-6 Understand Key Capabilities 24 Table 5-7 Shape Key Capabilities 25 Table 5-8 Engage Key Capabilities 25 Table 6-1 Top 15 Key Capabilities and DOTM Drivers 28 Table 6-2 Doctrine Driven Solutions for Key Capabilities 30 Table 6-3 Organisation Driven Solutions for Key Capabilities 31 Table 6-4 Training Driven Solutions for Key Capabilities 31 Table 6-5 Materiel Driven Solutions for Key Capabilities 33 Table 7-1 Linked National Activities 38 xi
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  • 15. 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Asymmetric threats, emerging technologies and operations in urban areas have been identified by an RTO (Research and Technology Organisation) Technical Report Land Operations in the Year 2020 (LO2020)1 as major features and potential challenges for Alliance Operations in the future. Increasing urbanisation is such that NATO forces may well continue to conduct urban operations in the future. Current NATO military concepts do not address this general trend in sufficient detail and there is no agreed Allied doctrine for operating in an urban environment. Following the LO2020 study which identified the impact of emerging technologies in future land operations, SHAPE Headquarters requested RTO to establish a Military Application Study (The Study Group) to study the joint and combined doctrine and concepts for operations in urban areas. Seven NATO nations (CA, FR, GE, IT, NL, UK, US) agreed to provide members for this Study Group. The SAS (Studies, Analyses and Simulation) panel agreed at their meeting in Lillehammer (May 2000) that the UK should provide the director for this Study Group and the first meeting took place in Washington (June 2000). Seven subsequent meetings have taken place in various NATO countries to examine the requirements of the SAS panel and to prepare a report for further consideration. 1.2 Purpose The purpose of the Study Group has been to develop a conceptual framework for operations in an urban area that will support future NATO missions and tasks in 2020. To provide an appropriate understanding of what this conceptual framework would encompass, the Study Group has addressed, in the first instance, the strategic operational and tactical aspects of conflict across the whole spectrum of warfare in generic urban environments. The force structure considered in this examination is a NATO / coalition joint force operation which might consist of a Combined Joint Task Force headquarters (CJTF) leading a corps sized land component, supported by an air and maritime component. The intent is to provide a concept that may prove to be the basis from which forces can respond to the challenges inherent in coalition operations in urban areas. When agreed, this concept should allow NATO military forces to respond to the challenges inherent in coalition operations in urban areas. This Report is to contribute to the NATO Defence Planning Process, the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the Concept Development Experimentation Process and provide direction for further research. 1.3 Objectives The specific objectives for the Study Group to examine have been: • A description of the urban environment in the future (up to 2020). • The construction of a conceptual framework for urban operations. • An identification of the operational level for missions and tasks when conducting operations in an urban environment. • A listing of the required urban operational capabilities for 2020. This, by implication, provides SHAPE with an awareness of the potential gaps in and between these capabilities. • To offer potential solutions for SHAPE to consider based on the detailed conclusions and recommendations of this Study Group. 1 Land Operations in the Year 2020 (LO2020); RTO-TR-8; A-323(SAS)TP/5; Published March 1999.
  • 16. 2 1.4 Study Group Approach The Study Group adopted a staged approach. It began with an examination of the future operating environment. It then outlined an overall conceptual framework for urban operations (Chapter 3) and operating guidelines (Chapter 4). This identified a number of desired operational level capabilities needed to conduct such operations successfully (Chapter 5). These capabilities were themselves refined against further operational parameters then tested in a controlled Urban Seminar Wargame (USW) using two scenarios: one of a crisis response operation and the other a war fighting situation. Finally this led to the identification of mission needs/needed capabilities (Chapter 6) and a potential “roadmap” to address them (Chapter 7). 1.5 Definition of Urban Operations For the purposes of this study operations in an urban area, or urban operations, are defined as those military and other activities in an area of operations where significant defining characteristics are man made physical structures, associated urban infrastructures and non-combatant populations.
  • 17. 3 CHAPTER 2 THE FUTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 2.1 Background Since NATO’s inception in 1949 there have been no large scale operations involving substantial NATO military ground forces fighting in urban areas. It appears to have been assumed that the experience gained from such operations during World War 2 would remain useful if urban operations became necessary. These assumptions should be re-considered not least because military operations are now constrained by legal, social and moral imperatives that did not apply previously and because technology promises military commanders new and potentially relevant capabilities. Demographic trends indicate that the further urbanisation of towns and cities will continue, and that future military operations of all types could be expected to have an urban dimension. Such operations will invariably involve political, diplomatic, economic and social considerations as well as strictly military ability. Future operations in urban areas are to be integrated with other government and non government agencies, particularly at the strategic and operational levels and that the process of decision making with an enlarged chain of command will reflect this. 2.2 The Urban Environment 2.2.1 The Nature of the Urban Area The urban environment is complex and diverse and ranges from sophisticated, metropolis-style superstructures within a well-developed infrastructure, to high and low density urban shantytowns with very poor infrastructure. It includes towns and cities that may themselves contain commercial, industrial and manufacturing areas, as well as a variety of communication and energy production facilities. The complexity of the current urban environment is perhaps best defined as the cumulative effect of a series of interconnected layers of society and infrastructure. These comprise different sized groupings of cultural, ethnic and social groupings living in differing conditions and with many diverse views about their role in the community. The commercial, industrial, administrative and residential areas may each need individual analysis. Indeed, today’s urban environment represents the centres of industry, commerce and social activities and, because of the size and the presence of different groups within it, is the probable area where tensions and perhaps conflicts are most likely to arise in the future. They could also continue to be very attractive to terrorist groups. 2.2.2 Trends in the Urban Environment Demographic trends indicate that populations are expanding, in some cases exponentially. Population growth leads inexorably to an increased urbanization as people move towards areas where jobs, some form of housing, basic resources and facilities are perceived to be available. However this may be a cause of tension where poverty, slums and poor living are a result of inadequate urban infrastructure. The Study Group considered that this trend would increase in significance and may in future lead to unrest, civil disorder and security threats which will compel local authorities to respond. 2.2.3 Globalisation Technical innovation and development particularly in the areas of communication and economic growth have improved significantly over the last decade. Extensive travel and the free flow of information around the world has brought the world into a much more inter-related community, and in doing so has exposed to international attention matters of local or national concern. National sovereignty issues are often highlighted in the international arena, sometimes in an awkward or unfavourable light.
  • 18. 4 There are undoubted benefits from this increased globalisation of world affairs but there are also unwanted side effects, which may confront traditional customs, religious values and the use of natural resources that could easily result in increased tensions, misunderstandings and possible conflict. Census figures also indicate that over half of the world’s population in 2020 will be living in urban areas, and thus the potential side effects of globalisation will probably be manifested initially in urban areas of the world. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Population in Billions 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Years Growth of the World Population Figure 2-1 Population Growth2 2.2.4 Population Migration In addition to the increasing population growth in the world there are noticeable sub- trends for populations, or large groups of people to move from less developed areas to more developed areas, predominantly urban, seeking economic and social improvement. Such migration can be the cause of national concern, increased tension and perhaps conflict, as resources become depleted, economic conditions and separate customs become intermingled and become the cause of resentment in the local and regional community. 2.2.5 Natural Resources The trends described above will, in their separate ways, have a direct effect on the use or abuse of natural resources in the world. In an ideal world there would be enough natural resources to satisfy all requirements, including projected population growth. In reality, though, in many parts of the world, it is anticipated that unequal population pressures, together with existing mismanagement and corruption, will lead to the exhaustion of natural resources sooner rather than later. Lack of water, especially, could well cause tensions and possible conflict particularly at the local level. Technical industrial developments and improvements in the agrochemical industry may well mitigate these problems. However it is estimated that the lack or abuse of natural resources will continue to be a growing concern to nations which have large populations in urban areas and who need natural resources from elsewhere to sustain life and livelihood (agriculture and industry). 2 US Census Bureau facts extracted from the Bureau’s Web Site. [URL – http://www-census.gov/ipc/www]
  • 19. 5 2.3 Military Considerations for the Urban Environment The Study Group considers that the following military considerations will be significant when planning operations in urban areas. These also reflect the enduring factors and trends described in LO2020, and are slanted towards operations in urban areas. 2.3.1 The Nature of Conflict in Urban Areas The fundamental character of conflict in urban areas will continue to present a serious physical and moral challenge for the soldier: a combination of extreme danger, rapidly changing circumstances and conditions of chaos and uncertainty, with severe physical demands placed on individuals. The capacity and mental outlook of a soldier to conduct aggressive close combat operations and to overcome the friction inherent in combat will remain paramount. The application of military force, particularly in urban areas, is likely to be influenced dramatically by current moral and social development. Changes could have their effect in making Rules of Engagement more complicated to apply and the timing of any application of military force more difficult to judge. Populations could well have a greater influence on future campaigns. This influence might start at the home base and could affect the sea, air and ground deployment corridors to the theatre of operations, from supportive (e.g. soldiers’ families, general public), dependent (e.g. refugees) to hostile (e.g. disaffected civilians in theatre and other pressure) groups. There will also be many official and unofficial agencies whose views will need to be considered and heeded where and when appropriate. The need to influence perceptions and public awareness reinforces the requirement for information to be handled in a systematic and coherent manner across the stages of an operation, including conflict and post-conflict activities. Information Operations are likely to undergo radical changes, but it is considered that these changes will probably have a direct and perhaps strategically decisive bearing on the conduct of future operations. These considerations will also have significant resource implications, which should be addressed now. 2.3.2 The Nature of the Enemy In recent years ethnic, tribal, social and political issues have re-emerged and provide the basis for tension and conflict in many areas around the world. Several instances of these tensions and conflicts have occurred already and this is likely to continue in the period under review. Many of these conflicts have not been of the View 1 type of scenario3 , although the two separate campaigns in Grozny were. The large majority of conflicts and sources of tension have followed more closely the View 2 scenario, or have resulted in some types of peacekeeping operations being conducted by either NATO or a coalition of other forces. The patterns of insurgency and counter insurgency around the world in the last few decades are that these have become urban in nature, and deliberately so in order to take advantage of the perceived weakness of counter insurgency forces to operate effectively in urban areas. It has for many years been recognised that by using an asymmetric approach an insurgent can operate more freely and effectively in crowded urban areas to harass the forces of law and order with a much reduced risk to himself. Guerrillas, insurgents and other non-state groups have all taken advantage of the benefits (to them) of operating in such an environment and will no doubt continue to do so.4 Military commanders will have to recognise that organisations, groupings, command and control arrangements and training will have to be reshaped, possibly in a radical manner, to deal effectively with these 3 Annex I to Land Operations in the Year 2020. (RTO AC/323(SAS)TR/5 Nov 98). View 1 represents warfare between two modern, well equipped, well trained, mechanised forces; while View 2 represents modern force opposed by organisations that do not necessarily represent states nor are they structured in the manner of most armies. 4 For example: Belfast, Mogadishu, and Bogota.
  • 20. 6 developments. View 1 and View 2 operations are not likely to be easily and separately identified. It is more likely that all operations will contain activity characterised by both types of view. 2.3.3 Future Technology The principal technological trends include those characterised by the opportunities available through advances in information collection and handling, miniaturisation of components, longer operational reach and greater clarity in intelligence and precision munitions, robotics, and non-lethal weapons. Picking the technological “winners” - those most likely to overcome the inherent complexity of modern day conflict - was the purpose of the NATO “Land Operations in the Year 2020” (LO2020) Study. That study identified ten technologies5 on which to focus, many of which have relevance in an urban environment. Other technologies and innovations could, however, be available to friend or foe alike and could also be “potential winners” in conflict in urban areas. 2.3.4 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (and Toxic) Hazards There is already evidence that information and technical knowledge concerning NBC weapons and toxic hazards are available to nations and non-state parties not subject to Arms Control agreements. Nuclear weapons technology is being acquired by potentially hostile states and perhaps non-state actors. Novel explosives and specialised chemical agents are becoming more generally available and there is growing interest in development of biological and bacteriological agents. The use of these weapons and devices would represent the extreme limit of military and civilian risk and may be applied to civilian as well as military targets. The likelihood of the presence, and potential use by adversaries, of NBC weapons and industrial or natural NBC agents in future conflict is increasing. The use of these weapons in an urban environment would magnify many times the difficulties of military operations. 2.3.5 The Use of Space The exploitation of space will become more important for military commanders. It will be necessary to integrate space capabilities with sub-space capabilities, including the manned and unmanned surveillance capabilities of land, air and maritime forces. Space-based systems will include: precision global navigation, communications, ISTAR, command and control warfare including counter ISTAR activities, the use of electronic warfare, and the early warning for, and counter to, ballistic missile attack. These systems, if they can overcome the urban “clutter” and line of site difficulties, will be of increasing importance and significance when dealing with potential enemies in urban areas. 2.4 Conclusions 2.4.1 General The US Bureau of Census projections for the world population growths show that these growths will increase by 25% from now until 2020 and that the vast majority of this increase will be located in urban areas. In many areas there will be more demand for limited natural resources and, coupled with the benefits and side-effects of globalisation there are bound to arise misunderstandings, tension and mismanagement of issues resulting 5 High power electrical technologies, directed energy weapons, computing technologies, communication technologies, electronic/information warfare technologies and electronic devices, biotechnology, structural materials technology, human factors and man-machine interfaces, precision attack technologies, automation and robotics.
  • 21. 7 from the use or abuse of these limited resources. Urban areas are therefore likely to become the principal arenas for these disputes and conflicts. 2.4.2 Implications for Military Commanders Operations in urban areas have always been difficult and hazardous for those involved and hitherto military commanders avoided such operations where this was possible. In the future these operations are likely to be unavoidable, difficult and complicated to conduct. The military commander will increasingly have to integrate military planning within an overall campaign plan prepared by national or international authorities and executed with multinational partners. Linked to this will be the problems associated with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and complex chains of command, all of which should be taken into account before operations start. Added to the traditional military hazards of operating in urban areas, there will be the extra complications associated with large extended urban and sub-urban areas, high rise buildings and underground areas. This will be further complicated by crowd control issues, cultural and racial differences, movement of non- combatants, operating in a three dimensional environment and the prospect of collateral damage to the infrastructure. The consequences of not dealing with these hazards appropriately could be immense for allied forces and non-combatants alike. The presence of significant numbers of non-combatants remains one of the defining characteristics of operations in an urban area. The military commander may have his freedom of action reduced by legal constraint. The attitude of the local populace, whether hostile, compliant or supportive, will be an important factor in planning an appropriately scaled and resourced force structure. The urban environment may both ease and amplify the operations and scrutiny of the media. Information operations will remain crucial. This will have implications on the organisation of HQs and staffs. 2.4.3 Implications for NATO The complexity of the urban environment will be a major factor in future operations. For NATO to succeed it has to have the appropriate concepts, doctrine, organisation, training and materiel for the future operating environment. A general deduction from these implications is that NATO, as an Alliance, may have to examine its current decision-making arrangements closely to take account of these emerging environmental developments. More complex judgements and decisions will have to be taken in what are likely to be fast moving military situations within a campaign complicated by concerns over casualties to allied forces, non-combatants and damage to critical infrastructure. Especially for contingencies that do not necessarily threaten NATO survival but require NATO military action, restrictive ROE may be imposed. For NATO civilian leaders, integration of the military campaign into overarching diplomatic, economic and informational lines of operation becomes paramount. This will necessarily involve deeper co-ordination with other international and regional organisations, non- governmental organisations and private volunteer groups.
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  • 23. 9 CHAPTER 3 THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO URBAN OPERATIONS 3.1 Background Traditional approaches to urban operations have been characterised by slow and linear progress, firepower solutions, significant casualties among non-combatants and the destruction of much infrastructure. There are many reasons for this approach to operations in urban areas; the desire to avoid own casualties, the lack of technical means to prevent wide scale destruction, an indifference to the needs of the local population and a desire to prevent enemy forces escaping. Today the effects of this type of approach could risk the strategic or operational objectives of the campaign and lose support from Allies in multinational operations. There is no formalised NATO doctrine for operating in urban areas and only the experience of the 2nd World War is available for allies to make use in conducting such operations. Hitherto it has generally been assumed that urban areas would be bypassed or vacated in any major conflict in Europe. More recently NATO forces have been involved with Non Article 5 operations – particularly in the Balkans and in areas that are either industrialised or urban in nature, and it is perceived that this trend will continue to grow in the next 20 years. All NATO nations train their forces to operate in open terrain adopting the manoeuvrist approach in their plans to defeat the enemy. This approach has now to be adapted to suit the terrain and conditions of urban areas. 3.2 Scope This chapter examines tenets of the manoeuvrist approach to operations and their applicability to urban operations. The Study Group approached this through the application of an emerging conceptual framework of Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate and Transition (USECT) that assists the design and development of a new operational framework for military tasks in urban areas. Major characteristics of this concept are that: • The manoeuvrist approach to operations is adopted. • The concept is pitched at the operational level. • The concept applies across the spectrum of conflict. 3.3 The Manoeuvrist Approach The manoeuvrist approach is defined as an approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. The principles and thought process that underpin the manoeuvrist approach apply to all operations including Operations Other Than War (OOTW). This is because the successful application of the manoeuvrist approach inspires a particular attitude of mind and a method of analysis that is relevant to any circumstances involving the use of military force to resolve conflict. The intent is to enable an operational commander to understand and shape the urban battlespace and engage targets with greater precision. NATO forces operating in the open can exploit sensor capabilities and firepower to good effect. In the future it is hoped that NATO will also achieve superiority in an urban environment by developing urban-specific capabilities to engage the enemy with precision and effect. This would be based on sound intelligence and consolidating their position effectively in order to pass authority for the control of urban areas back to civilian authorities.
  • 24. 10 3.4 Conceptual Framework Operations in urban areas demand a subtle blend of tempo, surprise, simultaneity and firepower that will differ in nature to high tempo operations in open terrain. A number of factors will influence this approach. There will be a need for selective destruction of certain targets and areas and this may mean close combat as an alternative to firepower if this is not effective. However, the more traditional street-by-street, house-by-house clearance method will require modification. Within close combat operations there will continue to be a need for stand-off attack to avoid closer combat. However, there will always be a need for forces to have the ability to operate in very close proximity with an enemy who may be fighting on familiar ground. Manoeuvring to defeat enemy forces in urban terrain will be more difficult. The urban terrain channels and restricts movement, routes can be blocked and ambushes and defensive strong points can prevent movement in an unrestricted manner. While air platforms are vulnerable, an ability to move 3 dimensionally will be necessary in order to achieve surprise and simultaneity, attacking an enemy at a time and place of one’s own choice with decisive results. Conventional operations that aim to clear whole areas have become unrealistic and probably unnecessary. It should not be the aim to engage the enemy in a close fight wherever he is found but rather, for decisive effect, to target the source of the enemy’s strength. However, locating particular objectives becomes difficult when an enemy chooses not to defend specific points but to remain mobile and has an unconventional C2 structure and few logistic resources. At the operational level, the selection of objectives and targets should aim to disrupt, through a concentration of effects, not only an enemy’s physical resources but also his morale and fighting spirit. Using the manoeuvrist approach as a foundation, a conceptual framework for planning and conducting urban operations can be constructed from the interrelated activities of USECT. Although outlined sequentially in this Chapter, these activities function together in an interdependent and simultaneous manner. USECT activities may be sequential or concurrent; they may often overlap. The point where one stops and another begins is often difficult to define. In some cases, the use of all five may not be necessary. For example, in some urban areas a commander may conduct Understanding and Shaping activities so effectively that he may be able to shift directly to Transition activities and hand over the operation to follow-on forces or other organisations, whereas in an adjacent neighbourhood, forces may be fully engaged. This illustrates the complexity of urban operations and the vital need to understand in order to allow shaping, engaging or consolidating activity. This is reflected in the diagram below. Figure 3-1 The USECT Construct UNDERSTAND ENGAGE CONSOLIDATE UNDERSTAND TRANSITION SHAPE
  • 25. 11 3.5 The Use of USECT for Operations in Urban Areas The manoeuvrist approach moves the focus from the traditionally predominant Engagement element – reflective of attrition – to the Understand element (usEct to Usect). By developing a better capability to Understand the urban battlespace, the enemy’s decisive points can be effectively targeted and the desired endstate achieved. The precepts for each of the five elements of USECT are summarised in this section. 3.5.1 Understand (U) The need to ‘understand’ will continue throughout any operation. It is critical to creating and maintaining an advantage in the tempo of any operation. An enemy may choose to operate in an urban environment to diminish the effect of NATO’s military capabilities and resources. While armed forces will have a range of technical equipments, weapons and other platforms to assist the acquisition of intelligence and information, the major overriding factor in the conduct of operations in urban areas is the population itself. NATO forces need to ensure that, wherever possible, it has the diplomatic, economic, social and cultural means to understand and influence the situation in urban areas. The requirement to understand the battle space includes evaluation of physical terrain, buildings, cultural centres and critical infrastructure such as utilities, transportation systems and hospitals. Threat analysis extends beyond conventional enemy forces to criminal gangs, vigilantes or insurgents operating among, and indistinguishable from the local population. The situation may be complicated by the presence of international non-military governmental departments. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) remains a valid tool but it is more complicated by the human factors present. Fighting in urban areas requires a great deal of specialised training and suitable equipment coupled with experience and confidence, which may not always be available. When preparing the Estimate a commander will need to evaluate all relevant forces, groupings, cultural and religious factors and to identify critical nodal points in the urban area not all of which are physical. Finding the enemy within the urban area is particularly difficult and is without guaranteed communications, yet a commander requires reliable information to maintain a proper awareness of the situation in order to manoeuvre troops with safety and to target systems with precision. The establishment of the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems is therefore fundamental to understanding. This should include the use of air and space sensors coupled with HUMINT sources and Special Operations Forces. Ground reconnaissance will also be required to complement this activity and probe areas where airborne and other remote sensors are unable to penetrate. At the same time civil-military links with suitable groups, agencies and institutions such as religious and community leaders, local government officials, public utilities personnel and local emergency services organisations will be important. A CIMIC plan to deal with non-combatants, refugees, displaced persons and injured civilians will be a fundamental part of the military campaign plan without necessarily compromising military security and freedom of action. 3.5.2 Shape (S) The term ‘Shaping’ includes all actions taken to set favourable conditions for the subsequent phases of Engagement, Consolidation and Transition activities. One aspect of Shaping is the strategic movement of forces into theatre and their positioning forces for operations. Depending on the situation and objectives to be achieved, forcible entry may be required. Shaping also includes actions to maximise mobility, force protection and establishing air and maritime superiority. At the same time, establishing refugee camps or sanctuaries for non-combatants, providing safe passage for them, and arranging emergency services, which as shaping activities at the highest level may be the early focus of tactical military activity. Information operations are an essential contributor to shaping. Enabling capabilities such as combat service support, are also part of shaping operations.
  • 26. 12 Shaping will involve activity to isolate portions of the battle space. Isolation has both an external aspect (i.e. of cutting off outside support), and an internal aspect (i.e. of cutting off mutual support). Isolating the adversary may also preclude his withdrawal. The physical isolation of a large urban area could have serious implications for the identification and control of the movement of personnel, equipment and non-combatants. Isolating an urban area in terms of information is also a very desirable part of the shaping process. A military commander should have the capability to achieve and sustain some form of information superiority over adversaries. Information passing into and out of the urban area may well be able to be managed in such a way as to cut off or prevent adversary communications, and establishing influence over indigenous radio, television and other media sources. As with all military operations, the Information Operations aspect of a campaign is to be integrated fully with other lines of operation such as civil affairs and psychological operations. Additionally, it has to be co-ordinated with national and perhaps international agencies so that all actions remain consistent with the overall strategic aim. The presence of international media and charitable organisations could make this task more difficult. Nevertheless, if efforts are properly co-ordinated, their application can multiply any advantage.6 At the operational level, shaping a campaign often requires the seizure, disruption, control or destruction of critical nodes (power grids, communication centres, etc) which have been previously identified during the IPB process in line with the requirements of International law. This may involve controlling key terrain, critical infrastructure and cultural centres unhinging an adversary’s decision cycle process, cutting or controlling inter-city and intra-city mobility links and communications, deliberately triggering an adversarial response or positioning forces to accomplish yet further phases of the operation. 3.5.3 Engage (E) The Shaping activities described above set the conditions for the engagement of adversarial forces. For the commander, engagement activities are those that directly address decisive points on the line of operations aimed at the adversary’s centre of gravity (see Fig 3-2). These will be those actions taken by the commander against a hostile force, a political situation, or natural or humanitarian predicament that will most directly accomplish his mission. At this point, the commander brings all available capabilities to bear in order to accomplish operational objectives. Engagement can range from large-scale combat operations in war to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in military operations other than war. In all cases where an enemy is confronted, recognition of his centres of gravity and identification of his decisive points will be critical to the success of one’s own operations. Integration and synchronisation of forces coupled with a clear knowledge of rules of engagement are critical when employing weapons in urban areas. Precision effects are required to deny the adversary the protection that could be gained from the urban environment. These engagements have to provide reasonable certainty of achieving the desired effect on the adversary – but with reduced risk of injury to non-combatants, collateral damage, or fratricide. 6 AJP-3 p.5-4/5.
  • 27. 13 Figure 3-2 llustration of Integrated Lines of Operations However, there are limitations on the effects of firepower (limited ranges, narrow fields of fire and the use of building materials) that may make it necessary to engage the enemy in close combat. A commander should allow for these contingencies in planning, bearing in mind that the aim is not just to seize and hold positions inside an urban area, but to apply strength against the enemy’s weakness using tempo as a controlling mechanism to shatter his organisational command and cohesion completely. 3.5.4 Consolidate (C) The focus of consolidation is on protecting what has been gained and retaining the initiative to continue to disorganise the adversary. Consolidation thus requires an ongoing process of organising and strengthening an advantage in tempo (spatial, psychological, informational) over the adversary. Consolidation also requires activities geared at mopping up adversarial forces that have been bypassed and processing prisoners. Civil affairs, public affairs and psychological operations activities will continue to be especially critical in this phase of the operation, as will engineering efforts which could range from demolition, repairs, clearing routes, bridge construction and water supply. During this stage of operations an adversary faced by conventional defeat may resort to terrorist activities to frustrate consolidation. A military commander will need to consider this possibility and make contingencies for this in the early stages of planning. At this stage also it is important to expand on the use of liaison and co- operation with local authorities and other agencies and there will be major challenges associated with infrastructure collapse, humanitarian assistance, and the movement of non-combatants. A commander has to address such tasks and possibly the problems associated with the effects of a weapon of mass destruction or an outbreak of disease. 3.5.5 Transition (T) The strategic objective for a military commander in urban areas is to transfer control of the urban area to the local civilian authorities or perhaps an international organisation. At this stage military forces would be gradually re-deployed while the work of the civil administration continues. The resettlement of displaced civilians and the reconstitution of national military forces if appropriate are central to a transition process. Essential to this task is that of maintaining the rule of law. To ensure safety and security, military forces may have to conduct training with indigenous or multinational law enforcement organisations. The rate of military redeployment will depend on how quickly those organisations establish an effective presence. DP: Decisive Point CoG: Centre of Gravity DP DP CoG Endstate DP DP DP DP Economic Social Military Diplomatic Informational DP
  • 28. 14 An exit strategy is usually thought of in terms of military redeployment. However until the local authorities have established a relatively safe and secure environment, law enforcement units, a judicial presence, and a recognised and functioning governmental office with oversight of civilian reconstruction efforts, NATO capabilities (both military and non-military) will continue to be required. The evidence gained so far is that this is usually far longer than first anticipated and that NATO does not have a specific strategy/doctrine for this phase. 3.6 Application of the USECT Framework The USECT framework is designed to assist the operational commander in a complex urban environment. It provides the basis for coherence and unity of purpose between subordinate components, and co-operation with non-military organisations. However, as an operational tool, it may not necessarily translate vertically down to tactical activity in every case. It is possible for instance, to see tactical units to be engaged, for example in a close battle, in order to achieve a shaping or consolidation task for the operational commander. 3.7 Conclusions The aim of the manoeuvrist approach to operations in urban areas, as described in this Chapter, is to achieve objectives with fewer casualties, less collateral damage to urban infrastructure, and reduced harm to the non- combatant population. The interrelated military and non-military activities described in the USECT process form the framework to achieve the aim. This general approach will enable NATO forces to function more effectively in the uncertain and often chaotic operations of an urban environment. Current NATO doctrine features the manoeuvrist approach to operations. It does not address in sufficient detail the complexities associated with the full spectrum of operations in urban areas. USECT provides a framework within which a commander can apply the manoeuvrist approach more effectively to urban operations. 3.8 Recommendations The Study Group recommends NATO adopt the USECT framework as the basis for all further development of concepts and doctrine for urban operations.
  • 29. 15 CHAPTER 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 4.1 Aim and Scope This Chapter identifies a range of operational concepts that could enable a future commander to carry out effective operations in an urban environment with reduced casualties and collateral damage. The operational concepts embody the manoeuvrist approach to operations which have been described in Chapter 3, and provide a basis for the identification of desired military capabilities for operating in urban areas that are addressed in Chapter 5. 4.2 Guidelines for Urban Operational Concepts In general, there are two guiding themes which will govern the selection of an operational concept for any given mission and scenario. These are to apply the manoeuvrist approach at the operational level, and to minimise the amount of close combat activities. 4.2.1 The Manoeuvrist Approach The application of the manoeuvrist approach to operations was described in the previous Chapter under the five headings of USECT. This approach applies at all levels of conflict and to all levels of ground-force involvement. Understanding and shaping the battle space before engaging, and controlling the tempo of operations are essential to the operational concept. 4.2.2 Minimise Close Combat Activities The most direct way of reducing friendly casualties is to reduce the amount of close combat required. There are three levels of ground-force activity that may be described as: None, Temporary and Sustained. No Ground-Force Activity. Examples of “No ground-force activity” include the isolation of an urban area, a blockade, or a standoff engagement. When applicable, this can be effective, but the range of tasks and the conditions to which this could apply is very limited. Temporary Ground-Force Activity. A number of tasks require at least a temporary, ground-force presence. Those cases include a limited offensive action against, e.g. an industrial facility or chemical industrial site (where stand-off destruction could release toxic materials), and non-combatant evacuation operations. Sustained Ground-Force Presence. Finally, a number of key tasks will require a sustained ground-force activity. These tasks include peace support operations, humanitarian assistance and CIMIC operations (OOTW), destroying a small isolated hostile force within an urban area (COIN, CIMIC, OOTW, CT activity) and capturing or defending an urban area (war fighting). Examples of operational capabilities that reduce the number of close-combat engagements include those that enable the isolation of sectors of the battlespace, interrupt the opponent’s lines of support, those that take advantage of remote sensing and engagement, and those that employ unmanned systems. 4.3 Missions in Urban Areas Those missions that have to be carried out in areas where manmade structures, non-combatants and infrastructure are significant features can be split into nine general categories grouped according to the mission’s objective.
  • 30. 16 If the objective is the urban area itself in whole or in part, the missions could be to: • Capture the urban area • Defend the urban area • Isolate/neutralise the urban area If the objective is within urban terrain, but not the urban area itself, the missions could be to: • Capture or destroy an enemy force operating within the urban area • Attack a node7 within the urban area • Defend or create a node within the urban area If the objective is to protect or assist people in an urban area, the missions could be to: • Neutralise combatants (e.g. peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations) • Provide humanitarian assistance • Conduct CIMIC operations 4.4 Assessing a Mission in an Urban Area This will be driven by the particular conditions surrounding the mission. The value of a capability can be measured by its effectiveness across a wide range of conditions. The types of conditions and the degree of challenge presented by each are illustrated by the following “spider chart” (Figure 4-1). Each leg or axis represents a separate dimension of “condition space,” and one can (at least qualitatively) represent the degree of difficulty posed by each condition according to the distance from the origin along its axis. Thus, a specific warfighting scenario may be represented by a polygon that intersects the axes at various distances from the origin. “Easier” cases are close to the centre point and more difficult cases are further out. As an example, Figure 4-1 illustrates the changing conditions during two phases of a possible NATO action in an urban area. The attitude of civilians, the increase in the level of conflict, the increase in NATO’s political hesitancy, and the increase in the opponent’s political will are the major changes. 7 A “node” could be an element that is critical to the success of an operation. It includes not only physically localised critical points such as a command centre or WMD-facility, but also more general features such as a logistics system or even the mindset of an ethnic group.
  • 31. 17 Local Politics, Economics, Culture Opponent’s Capabilities, Political Will, Morale Size,PhysicalType, Infrastructure Joint,Interagency,Coalition, NGO International Conditions, Campaign ScheduleTerrain, Climate, Weather LevelofConflict Attitudesof Civilians NATO Political Hesitancy Location Tempo ROE Situation Aug 2020 Situation Dec 2020 Spider Chart Figure 4-1 Example of Changing Conditions Affecting Urban Capabilities Note that the axes are not independent. For example, when the “Attitude of Civilians” is favourable (close to the centre point) the ROE tend to be more stringent (far from the centre point). The sets of missions and conditions outlined above broadly characterise the challenges that could be faced by a future military Commander. Any combination of changes could occur literally “overnight” in any portion of the urban environment. Such is the extreme complexity of urban operations. A “toolkit” of capabilities has to be designed and developed to enable the commander to succeed under realistic conditions. 4.5 Operational Concepts A future commander has to be able to develop an effective concept of operations for any given mission and set of conditions. In order to determine the operational capabilities that would enable him to do this, each mission has to be considered and a range of possible operational concepts identified. The Study Group initiated this process by examining one of the most complex and challenging missions, that of capturing an urban area. This mission was selected because it was considered that the set of capabilities needed to support a range of operational concepts for this mission would, in general, also support the other missions. For example, to capture a city a commander has to be able to defeat smaller elements of an opposing force within urban terrain; to attack, create or defend nodes; to deal with various aspects of the population; and to defend urban areas after they are captured (consolidation). This encompasses many of the capabilities needed for the other missions as well. A number of general types of operational concepts that might be employed to capture an urban area are listed in Figure 4-2. Several of these concepts might be used in combination in a given scenario, e.g., in different areas, or at different times. They are separated here for clarity. Figure 4-1 distinguishes the operational concepts between those that are “traditional” and those that are “emerging” (or “new”). The principal methods associated with each concept are listed as Isolation, Remote Strike, or Ground Assault. Isolation and Remote Strike concepts may not require penetration of the urban area by a sizeable ground force whereas the Ground Assault concepts do.
  • 32. 18 Isolation is aimed at denying an opponent any advantages of occupying the urban area. Dependent upon the level of the operation this can include isolating him physically, politically, electronically or psychologically. This multi-track approach can fix an opponent on both the moral and physical planes and achieve much more than freedom of manoeuvre on the physical plane. Freedom of action politically, morally and psychologically may also follow. Siege can isolate an opponent’s forces from the rest of a campaign and thereby neutralise their potential contribution, or, as in many past instances, siege can be used to “starve them out.” Siege requires a willingness to accept responsibility for the effects on the civilian population unless it could be evacuated to safety. Depending on the size of the urban area, siege may also require large numbers of forces (50,000 Russian troops were required to isolate Grozny during the second Chechen campaign) and this sort of concept may not be feasible with large, sprawling urban areas. Siege also takes time to achieve success, and for that reason alone may be precluded in a number of scenarios. Remote Strike Destruction Ground Assault Frontal SiegeIsolation Precision Strike Nodal Capture and Expansion Segment and Capture/Isolate Soft-Point Capture & Expansion Nodal Isolation CONCEPTS TRADITIONAL EMERGING Figure 4-2 Some Types of Operational Concepts: Capture the Urban Area Nodal Isolation is an emerging concept that denies an occupying force access to, or use of, critical facilities within the urban areas. Elements of this approach may include: information operations to control facilities such as power stations, or communication networks; the creation of “keep-out” zones using remote surveillance, remote generation of precision, non-lethal effects, or deployed robotic sentries; or the similar control of transportation routes and facilities. Again, the idea is to deny the utility of the urban area to an opponent’s forces with a minimum of civilian casualties or collateral damage. Remote Strike concepts employ area destruction or precision strikes to defeat opposing forces and deny them advantages that the urban area provides (cover, supplies, information, and utilities). Destruction of an area can be achieved as a last means when accurate targeting information and accurate weapon delivery systems are not available. In any given situation the effectiveness of this concept would depend on NATO’s willingness to accept responsibility for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the level of the opponent’s determination to remain in the urban area. For example, it may be to NATO’s advantage for the military commander to leave an escape route open for an opponent to encourage his withdrawal. However, emerging capabilities in targeting and weapon delivery offer the promise of enabling more surgical (“precision”) strikes. With such strikes, unintended casualties and collateral damage may be reduced making the use of this concept a more acceptable option for a military commander.
  • 33. 19 A ground assault concept involves forces entering urban areas. These could include frontal sweeps through the area (which maintain access to supplies through controlled territory), and the capture of nodes by vertical assault and/or ground penetration and depending on the situation a further expansion out from those nodes. The nodes chosen could be critical elements of the opponent’s defences or soft points in his defences that could be exploited as a base for subsequent expansion. “Segment and Capture/Isolate” is another ground assault concept that uses remote isolation techniques or penetration by ground forces to divide the urban area into segments. Segments that are critical to the opponent may then become the focal points of subsequent military action while sparing less critical areas. Three of these types of operational concepts correspond to traditional approaches to capturing a city: Siege, Destruction, and Frontal Assault. These approaches may be necessary because of the lack of a capability for gaining information, caused by technological or political restrictions, in an urban environment. A military force either avoids entering the urban area (Siege or Destruction) or enters it with ground forces and gains more information of enemy positions and capabilities by establishing contact by means of combat and then responding with overwhelming lethal force. Under most conditions these three operational concepts could easily result in high levels of non-combatant casualties. Destruction and frontal assault will also result in extensive collateral damage, and in the case of the latter can be expected to result in high friendly casualties as well. The five “emerging” operational concepts (listed in Figure 4-2) are more surgical in nature than the traditional concepts and offer the prospect of significantly reducing both friendly and civilian casualties, and collateral damage. They also may be better able to achieve success and require fewer military forces than the more traditional methods. 4.6 Operational Capabilities Needed to Enable the Concepts In general, the more focussed operational concepts require much higher levels of military capabilities to conduct the first 3 stages of USECT than the traditional concepts. For example, they require military capabilities to: • Identify nodes that support facilities within the urban area or important elements of the enemy force. • Strike those nodes with limited or no collateral damage. • Penetrate with an assault force to interior points of the urban area and to sustain them there. • Isolate sectors of the urban area. Having identified a range of operational concepts, the next step is to identify the set of capabilities needed to enable the concepts to operate effectively. These are addressed in more detail in Chapter 5. 4.7 Conclusions Operational level commanders can be expected to accomplish a range of missions within the urban environment. Of the nine missions identified, the “Capture the Urban Area” mission encompasses a sufficiently wide range of operational concepts with implied capabilities that apply to the other urban missions as well. The operational concepts fall into two general categories, a “traditional” group (siege, destruction, frontal assault) that would emphasise the “Engage” component of USECT, and an “emerging” group (nodal isolation and capture, precision strike, segment) that would emphasise the “Understand” and “Shape” components. The latter group holds the promise of significantly reducing casualties and collateral damage but also requires that new war fighting capabilities be available to a military commander. 4.8 Recommendations The Study Group recommends that NATO adopt the mission types and emerging operational concepts identified as the basis for further NATO studies, investigations and experiments into urban operations. It is further recommended that NATO develop the operational concepts in greater detail.
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  • 35. 21 CHAPTER 5 CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 5.1 Aim and Scope Given the complexity and the challenges of operations in urban areas a commander needs new means to accomplish the variety of operational tasks that he may encounter. This Chapter aims to identify the operational level capabilities required to carry out the full spectrum of concepts. These capabilities have been structured in line with the USECT process. This Chapter also lists the identified operational capabilities in order of importance for operations in urban areas. These capabilities form the basis for either Materiel (M) solutions or Non-Materiel solutions described in the areas of Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTLPF). These are described in more detail in Chapter 6. 5.2 Background In 2020, a NATO commander should be capable of conducting operations in urban areas across the full spectrum of conflict, from crisis response to war fighting operations. Not withstanding the level of conflict, there is a view that a generic task to capture and hold an urban area is a most complex and difficult one. This task may involve a wide range of different operational concepts, from which a military commander may chose one or more to accomplish his task. The operational concepts explained in Chapter 4 for such a mission formed the starting point for an initial set of 53 capabilities necessary to conduct operations in urban areas compiled from national views. At the Capability Assessment Seminar (CAPS) held in September 2001, these capabilities were re-examined and subsequently revised, resulting in a consolidated list of 42 capabilities (See Annex C - CAPS). It should be pointed out that all of these capabilities are necessary for a military commander to successfully accomplish operations in an urban environment. However, to allow a more detailed examination of the most important operational level capabilities, some 15 were identified as the “key capabilities” and subsequently used in the Urban Seminar Wargame later in the year (November 2001). 5.3 Operational Level Capability Requirements Although the concepts proposed for operations in urban areas vary considerably from concepts designed for other environments, a detailed examination resulted in the conclusion that at the operational level capabilities required are very similar for whatever type of operational concept envisaged. The capabilities are defined by utilising the USECT framework described in Chapter 3. Of the 42 capabilities identified 7 support “Understand”, 18 support “Shape”, 10 support “Engage”, 5 support “Consolidate” and 2 support “Transition”. Some capabilities support more than one element of USECT. To avoid repetition each capability is only listed once in the list. There is no relationship between the number of capabilities supporting a particular aspect of USECT and its importance. 5.3.1 Understand (U) At the operational level “Understand” (U) continues to apply throughout all phases of an operation in urban areas. The following 7 capabilities provide a military commander with the collection, assimilation, management and distribution of information necessary to overcome the complexities of the urban battlespace. Further definition of the capabilities is detailed at Annex C.
  • 36. 22 NUMBER CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT U 1 Process, format and distribute large scale data and information aimed at improving the acquiring and decision making process U 2 Know the location and status of own forces U 3 Have an overall understanding of the international, regional and local situation and in context with other factors such as population, ethnic, cultural, political factions, other agencies, NGOs and groupings. U 4 Establish a clear understanding of own forces capabilities and limitations U 5 Establish a psycho-sociological profile of the potential enemy, neutrals, key players and the population U 6 Determine intent, aim, location, movement, status, capabilities, support structure of potential enemy forces, neutrals, key players and population U 7 Acquire an accurate understanding of the infrastructure, the systems and the dynamics of the designated urban area and their impact on operations (identify the key nodes and vulnerabilities) Table 5-1 Understand Capabilities 5.3.2 Shape (S) “Shape” includes all actions taken to set favourable conditions for campaign success. The required capabilities enable a military commander to minimise enemy capabilities, neutralise or leverage local population effect(s) on the operation, influence the media impact on an operation and enhance own forces ability to win. The following 18 capabilities are required: NUMBER CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT S 1 Monitor and control crowds within urban areas S 2 Selective control of infrastructure, utilities and non-military communications S 3 Restrict the effect of chemical, biological and radiological hazards on own troops and non-combatants S 4 Restrict enemy movement/logistics/intentions S 5 Provide the appropriate level of mobility (surface/above surface/sub-surface, including under water) to operate effectively in urban areas S 6 Provide own forces with adequate protection against the entire threat S 7 Manage and influence the media’s impact on operations S 8 Isolate an urban battle space S 9 Influence the local population S 10 Establish, secure and maintain own forces support systems (logistics, medical, etc) S 11 Enable a force to use the battlespace within the urban environment to best advantage S 12 To utilise the combined arms effects on operations at the lowest level S13 Detect, identify and assess rapidly chemical, biological and radiological threats (this includes toxic threats) S 14 Deny the enemy from operating effective C4ISTAR systems S 15 Deceive enemy as to own force intentions and actions S 16 Co-ordinate joint/interagency/coalition activities S 17 Control (stimulate/prevent) non-combatant mass movement S 18 Assure C4 interoperability for own forces Table 5-2 Shape Capabilities 5.3.3 Engage (E) “Engage” represents those actions taken by a military commander to defeat decisively an enemy in urban areas with minimum casualties and collateral damage, while at the same time being in a position to deal with
  • 37. 23 local populations and providing humanitarian assistance for others. In addition, a commander should plan to operate with dispersed/isolated own forces. The following 10 “Engage” capabilities are needed: NUMBER CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT E 1 Destroy or neutralise in a timely manner, fixed or mobile point targets in the urban environment with minimum casualties and collateral damage E 2 Provide and sustain combat power and maintain tempo of own forces E 3 Being in a position to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict E 4 Operate with dispersed/isolated forces E 5 Provide for displaced populations and non-combatants E 6 Establish a reliable Friend-Foe-Civilian Identification E 7 Ensure basic provision for the non-combatants within any sieged area E 8 Dominate the EM spectrum E 9 Destroy wide-area targets in all dimensions8 E 10 Conduct cyber operations Table 5-3 Engage Capabilities 5.3.4 Consolidate (C) During “Consolidate” , the emphasis at the operational level lies in the establishment of a secure urban area, the assessment of urban battle damage and the provision of humanitarian support for local population (where appropriate). The military commander needs the following five capabilities: NUMBER CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT C 1 Establish a secure environment in an urban area C 2 Take account of the effects of WMD and other environmental hazards where appropriate C 3 Ensure swift and effective medical support, food, water, etc. for the population C 4 Re-establish the civil administration C 5 Control displaced persons and non-combatants Table 5-4 Consolidate Capabilities 5.3.5 Transition (T) “Transition” is the transfer of control of an urban area to local military and civil authorities or international organisations as appropriate while at the same time reducing the levels of own forces with a view to redeployment elsewhere. A military commander needs the following two capabilities: NUMBER CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT T 1 Conduct “exit” operations for the force T 2 Return control of urban areas to civil authorities Table 5-5 Transition Capabilities All capabilities mentioned above are considered to be necessary at an operational level for a commander to conduct operations in urban areas effectively. Nonetheless, some of these capabilities deserve specific attention because they are considered to be critical for success. These capabilities are hereafter referred to as key operational level capabilities. 8 Destruction of targets that are in effect a general area rather than specified, smaller or pinpoint targets.

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