Natech accidents following the Great Eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami Elisabeth Krausmann1 and ...
Characteristics:• Main shock: Mw = 9• Depth 32 km• Fault rupture ca. 300 x 150 km• Ground motion duration: 240s• ...
What about industry? Chemical industry in natural-hazard zones: major accident potential with secondary consequences on ...
Natech accidents are particularly problematic because:+ Natural disasters can trigger simultaneous releases from single or...
Natech accidentsNatural-event impact on chemical infrastructures: At least 40% of surveyed EU MS and OECD Member Coun...
Natech analysisPreliminary analysis of Natech accidents:  how did facilities perform under the natural-disaster loads...
Plant categories + Energy-related industries (Refineries, gas manufacturing, LNG terminal, etc.): 6 + Petrochemicals (Pl...
Preliminary analysis+ Major events in analysed facilities: 52  6 F, 5 Ex, 41 D+ Main accident trigger: Earthquake (28 c...
Case study 1 Chiba refinery+ 220,000 ...
Case study 2 Sendai refinery + 145,000 b/d corresponding to 3% of refining capacity in Ja...
Loss overview+ Losses due to damage (buildings, equipment, raw materials & products) and business interruption (downtime)...
What went wrong?+ In-depth analysis required to understand reasons for industrial damage and downtime, probably several...
Lessons learned + Facilities with a major accident potential should not be sited in natural-hazard prone areas. + Ind...
Ongoing and future work+ Continue data collection from all sources incl. further field trips to the affected areas.+ Ass...
Conclusions+ Natural disasters can have a major impact on industry with serious consequences on man, the environment, th...
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!Contact: elisabeth.krausmann@jrc.ec.europa.eu ...
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Natech accidents following the great eastern japan earthquake and tsunami

Elisabeth KRAUSMANN1, Ana Maria CRUZ2 1European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Italy; 2Consultant, Natech risk management and emergency planning, France, and Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Japan;
Published on: Mar 3, 2016
Published in: Education      Technology      Business      
Source: www.slideshare.net


Transcripts - Natech accidents following the great eastern japan earthquake and tsunami

  • 1. Natech accidents following the Great Eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami Elisabeth Krausmann1 and A.M. Cruz2 European Commission, Joint Research Centre 1 Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen Ispra, ItalyNatech risk management consultant, Bordeaux, France & Disaster2 Prevention Research Insitute, Kyoto University, Japan Serving society Stimulating innovation Supporting legislation
  • 2. Characteristics:• Main shock: Mw = 9• Depth 32 km• Fault rupture ca. 300 x 150 km• Ground motion duration: 240s• Max. PGA: 2.7g• Tsunami: max. recorded >7 m (39m)Consequences:• > 15,800 fatalities• > 3,000 missing• 46,000 buildings destroyed, 144,000 damaged 2
  • 3. What about industry? Chemical industry in natural-hazard zones: major accident potential with secondary consequences on the surroundings (fires, explosions, toxic releases)  NATECH accidents For the purpose of this study a “Natech” accident is defined as achemical accident caused by a natural hazard or a natural disaster Chemical accidents include accidental oil and chemical spills, gas releases, and fires or explosions 3Earthquake, Turkey, 1999 Hurricane, USA, 2005 Floods, Czech Republic, 2002 Earthquake, China, 2008
  • 4. Natech accidents are particularly problematic because:+ Natural disasters can trigger simultaneous releases from single ormultiple sources over wide areas.+ Lifelines needed for disaster mitigation (water, power) are likely to beunavailable.+ Simultaneous emergency response efforts are required to cope withboth the natural disaster and the technological accident (competition forscarce resources).+ Hazardous-materials releases can hamper emergency response byendangering rescue personnel and disaster victims.+ Standard civil protection measures may not be functional or appropriate. 4
  • 5. Natech accidentsNatural-event impact on chemical infrastructures: At least 40% of surveyed EU MS and OECD Member Countries have experienced one or more Natech accident, sometimes with fatalities and injuries, environmental or economic damage, or supply disruption+ Hurricanes Katrina & Rita (USA, 2005): 113 off-shore platforms destroyed, 163 severelydamaged; hike in global oil price; release of 30 million litres oil onshore;+ Summer floods (Czech Republic, 2002): release of 80 tons of chlorine & several dozentons of other hazardous chemicals, including dioxins; crops damaged or destroyed bythe chlorine cloud causing significant economic losses for surrounding farmers;+ Kocaeli earthquake (Turkey, 1999): multiple fires in a refinery producing 1/3 ofTurkey’s total oil-related output; international assistance required to cope with theaccident. 5
  • 6. Natech analysisPreliminary analysis of Natech accidents:  how did facilities perform under the natural-disaster loads?  select 43 chemical industriesInformation sources: + Company websites, newspapers, commercial chemical-industry business news (status 17 August 2012) + Field visit and interviews with government officials (November/December 2011) 6 ©AP
  • 7. Plant categories + Energy-related industries (Refineries, gas manufacturing, LNG terminal, etc.): 6 + Petrochemicals (Plastics, polymers, rubber etc.): 19 + Fine chemicals (Pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, etc.): 5 + Metallurgy and electrochemistry (Steel mills, semiconductors, etc.): 9 + Other (Construction materials, etc.): 4 7©Mainichi Daily News ©AP ©NYPost
  • 8. Preliminary analysis+ Major events in analysed facilities: 52  6 F, 5 Ex, 41 D+ Main accident trigger: Earthquake (28 cases); 13 tsunami; 2 reported domino effects (Chiba industrial area)+ Damage severity: earthquake: 20% severe, 86% minor; tsunami: 80% severe, 14% minor+ Health effects largely unknown; 6 + 3 injuries reported; little information on pollution; evacuation of residents due to explosions or toxic releases 8 ©KyodoAP
  • 9. Case study 1 Chiba refinery+ 220,000 b/d corresponding to 5% of refining capacity in Japan; PGA on site 0.114g.+ Fire and explosions due to earthquake-triggered LPG tank collapse; automatic safety valve switched manually to open, no emergency shutdown possible  VIOLATION OF SAFETY REGULATIONS!!!!!+ Destruction of all 17 LPG tanks and surrounding pipelines; asphalt tanks adjacent to LPG storage also damaged with releases; >1,100 residents evacuated+ 10d for extinguishing fire; partial operations resumed January 2012.+ Debris from explosions caused two domino effects (fires) at neighbouring facilities. 9 ©APKyodo
  • 10. Case study 2 Sendai refinery + 145,000 b/d corresponding to 3% of refining capacity in Japan. + Severe damage on-site due to tsunami (2.5-3.5m), minor damage due to earthquake (PGA > 0.45g). + Almost entire western section of refinery burned down including sulphur, asphalt and gasoline tanks, as well as pipelines. + Evacuation radius 2km due to burning sulphur (toxic gas cloud). + 5d until fires extinguished; resuming of operations in March 2012 10©AP
  • 11. Loss overview+ Losses due to damage (buildings, equipment, raw materials & products) and business interruption (downtime).+ Downtime of analysed facilities (where data available): ≤ 1 week > 1 week ≤ 1 month > 1 month ≤ 6 months > 6 months ≤ 1 year > 1 year - 10% (4) 71% (27) 8% (3) 10% (4)+ Financial losses: little information available. Examples: - JX Nippon Oil & Energy: Sendai refinery - 1.1 billion US$ (31/03/2011) - Cosmo Oil: Chiba refinery – 760 million US$ (FY2010-11) - Kashima Oil: Kashima refinery - 247 million US$ (31/03/2011) - Sakai Chemicals: 17 million US$ (31/03/2011) 11
  • 12. What went wrong?+ In-depth analysis required to understand reasons for industrial damage and downtime, probably several contributing factors: model uncertainties reflected in insufficient design, overconfidence in existing safety measures, cost/benefit considerations, complacency.  administrative sanctions by JP trade ministry for Cosmo Oil: “The fire was allowed to spread outside the refinery and the emergency shutdown functions for Cosmo Oil LPG facilities failed to operate properly. [….] The oil refiner will no longer be allowed to carry out is own inspections and will need to shut all units at the refinery for maintenance once a year for the next two years.” (Reuters, 30 June, 2011)+ Resuming of operations hampered by aftershocks, tsunami alerts, evacuation of personnel, lack of utilities (water, electricity), damage to infrastructures (berths, roads etc.) and shortage of raw materials. 12
  • 13. Lessons learned + Facilities with a major accident potential should not be sited in natural-hazard prone areas. + Industry and responders are not always prepared for a major event. + The implementation of safety regulations needs to be monitored. + Operating procedures may need to be reviewed for future accident prevention. + The communication flow needs to be improved to provide for faster emergency response (telephone not working, access roads blocked or destroyed). 13©AP_IInouye
  • 14. Ongoing and future work+ Continue data collection from all sources incl. further field trips to the affected areas.+ Assess (non)structural damage in industrial facilities, hazardous- materials releases, health and environmental impact, economic impact and impact on the supply chain.+ Assess the disaster management process for both the industry and the community.+ Assess recovery and reconstruction activities incl. retrofitting in industrial facilities.+ Based on the lessons learned from the in-depth analysis propose recommendations for future accident prevention and mitigation. 14
  • 15. Conclusions+ Natural disasters can have a major impact on industry with serious consequences on man, the environment, the economy and the supply chain+ The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami have shown that even prepared countries are at risk  many important lessons can be learned+ A framework for Natech risk reduction exists but guidelines, specific consolidated methodologies, tools and reliable data are missing+ Further research needed to better understand: – Which are Natech-prone areas? – Does the design-basis for installations in these areas need to be expanded to cover Natechs? – What additional measures (prevention/mitigation) need to be taken and how they should be evaluated? – What are the implications for emergency planning and preparedness? 15
  • 16. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!Contact: elisabeth.krausmann@jrc.ec.europa.eu 16