September 2014
The development of this Toolkit was made possible through the generosity of the United States Agency
for ...
Coordinator, Program on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, Physicians for Human Rights; Laura
Arriaza, international human...
Introduction .......................................................................................................
Atrocity crimes – including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity – which are marked by
the large...
I. Hate Speech as Early Warning
Monitoring, Intervention, and
Hate speech – speech that incites or advocates
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, is “advocacy of hatred on
prohibited grounds that ...
particularly when it is tracked and analyzed. This
enables early warning and action in the face of
potential violence, and...
undecided. Rather than ratchet down
tensions, many observers have argued this
further polarized parties and led to the
What to
When to
Why? Possible actions
Identify and
track key
bringing in Mediabadger, a small analytical firm, to
do a scoping study using its own online search
engine to identify inc...
d’Ivoire to get participants’ views on what to
track. In Cote d’Ivoire, Freedom House held a
workshop with a group of CSOs...
VI. Lessons learned/best practices
Key findings related to the overall concept and
dynamics of media monitoring include:
• Media monitoring programs face the
same challenges of other media
development programs including
o Media literacy on the...
Best Practices: Creating a
Functioning Media Monitoring
Monitoring the media can be a helpful tool in
efforts to pr...
o Those who are able to report most
accurately on growing tensions
• Track implementing as well as strategic
actors. Highe...
o Create counter messaging or discredit
o Create an alarm network that allows
civil society to share incidences o...
II. The Role of Secure Human
Rights Documentation in Atrocity
Mass atrocities are highly dynamic events often
sense of social inclusion for victims, and serve as
an early warning network of renewed instability.
Atrocities rarely occ...
Documentation and Reporting: East Africa Scenario
Monitors of the human rights organization learn of the possible presence...
methodology and verification plan supported the
credible reporting of human rights violations
collected through interviews...
Additionally, the importance of describing their
work as “documentation” rather than
“investigation” was also emphasized, ...
Missions can likewise play a vital role by
supporting local organizations to obtain technical
expertise. Organizations int...
Diagram 1
III. The Role of Transitional
Justice in Atrocity Prevention
Transitional justice is now utilized by countries i...
Transitional justice measures including
prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations and
institutional reform are contingent p...
Mechanism Description Considerations
Domestic Trials
(Examples: Argentina,
Peru, Burundi)
Transitional Justice as Urgent
Though transitional justice processes are
generally long-term initiatives whic...
As most atrocity crimes happen during conflict,
transitional justice responses can be used to
resolve underlying grievance...
publically legitimate enough to achieve their
• What, if any, internationally-supported
efforts are ongoing to supp...
Documentation: Syria’s civil war began from
peaceful street demonstrations in 2011 calling for
a more democratic state and...
ABA Rule of Law Initiative. 2014. Community
Participation in Transitional Jus...
Type of TJ
(list all on
separate rows)
Ongoing or
Time Period
IV. Justice Sector Interventions
in Atrocity Prevention
Preventing atrocities is a vital and difficult
challenge particula...
In many conflict-affected countries, justice
sector institutions and actors are destroyed as a
result of violence or civil...
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Preventing Atrocities Toolkit 2014 (1)

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  • 3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The development of this Toolkit was made possible through the generosity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared through the RIGHTS LWA, under the Democracy Fund Global Human Rights Program award (AID-OAA-LA-0007). Freedom House, the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI), Internews, and Global Rights contributed chapters to this report. The authors of this report would particularly like to thank Mark Goldenbaum, Lawrence Woocher, and Andrew Soloman at USAID for supporting this project. These chapters are prepared for inclusion in a USAID Atrocity Prevention Toolkit produced by the USAID’s Center of Excellence for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance for USAID Missions worldwide. Freedom House’s Senior Advisor for International Legal Affairs, Lisa Davis, and Program Officer, Russell Raymond, managed the production of this toolkit by The RIGHTS Consortium. Russell Raymond and Senior Program Associate Kim Hart served as lead authors on “The Role of Transitional Justice in Atrocity Prevention.” The chapter also received valuable contributions and guidance from Lisa Davis and Sanja Pesek, Ph.D. Russell Raymond also served as lead author for “The Role of Secure Human Rights Documentation in Atrocity Prevention,” with guidance and input from Lisa Davis. Freedom House would also like to thank Erik Gustafson for conducting contributing research, as well as Oulie Keita and Filifing Diakite for their generous support. Freedom House would also like to acknowledge and thank the following current and former Freedom House staff for their substantive input into the joint Freedom House-Internews chapter “Hate Speech as Early Warning: Monitoring, Intervention & Mitigation”: Lisa Davis, Chloe Schwenke, Mary McGuire, Courtney C. Radsch, Karin D. Karlekar, Raquel O’Byrne, Melanie Dominski, Nicole Greene, Maité Hostetter, Sabina Vigani, Rodrigue Kone Fahiraman and Justice Mavedzenge. Additionally, Freedom House would like to express its sincere gratitude to its project partner, Mike MacKinnon and the staff at Media Badger, for their skillful data collection and analysis, as well as meaningful consultation that allowed us to implement the “dangerous speech” project. We also thank Dr. Susan Benesch, whose academic work on hate and “dangerous” speech underpinned the conceptualization of the project. Finally, Freedom House would like to extend a sincere thank you to Melinda Burrell, whose patience and dedication in writing and editing the chapter was invaluable. This report was edited for publication by Russell Raymond. Will Ferroggiaro, Project Director – Conflict and Media, , wrote Internews’ contribution of the joint chapter “Hate Speech as Early Warning: Monitoring, Intervention & Mitigation” for Internews. Josh Machleder, Internews Vice President for Europe, Eurasia and Human Rights, provided commentary and guidance. Consultant George Lyle contributed initial legal research. Internews country teams in Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Burma, and their respective chiefs of party—Ida Jooste, Mark Walsh, and Alison Campbell, respectively—provided key local insights and context, as did Brice Rambaud, Edna Ipalei, Timur Oganov, Darin Bielecki, Michael Pan, and Pete du Toit. Finally, Internews thanks the media representatives, civil society activists, and government officials in Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Burma who generously gave their time, information, and insights in confidential interviews in the course of this project. ABA ROLI Senior Access to Justice Advisor Jennifer Tsai served as the lead author on “Justice Sector Interventions in Atrocity Prevention.” She benefited immensely from the advice and guidance of expert consultant, Jane Stromseth, Senior Atrocity Prevention Advisor. ABA ROLI wishes to extend particular thanks to members of an expert working group for reviewing the working paper: Christine Alai, Kenya
  • 4. Coordinator, Program on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, Physicians for Human Rights; Laura Arriaza, international human rights lawyer and researcher; Annie Bird, Policy Advisor, Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State; Scott Carlson, Senior Vice-President, Democracy Council and Founder, New-Rule LLC; Jyotsana Bela Kapur, United Nations adviser; Naomi Kikoler, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; David Mandel- Anthony, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Global Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of State; Elysée Sindayigaya, consultant on rule of law, conflict resolution and capacity building and former Deputy Director, Democratic Republic of Congo, ABA ROLI; and Jane Stromseth. ABA ROLI is extremely grateful for the time and assistance rendered by those who agreed to be interviewed for this project. ABA ROLI Research Fellow Jacqueline Greene provided significant research assistance. Global Rights’ chapter “The Role of National Human Rights Institutions and Paralegals in Atrocity Prevention” was based on in-country pilots led by our Country Directors Abiodun Baiyewu (Nigeria) and Donald Rukare (Uganda) implemented together with the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission and the Uganda Human Rights Commission and civil society organization partners – Isa Wali Empowerment Initiative and Bauchi Human Rights Network (Nigeria) and Child Concern Initiative Organization, Bundibugyo NGO-CBO Forum, and Bundibugyo Women Federation (Uganda). The chapter was drafted by Kathleen Cornelsen, Legal Fellow and Mary Wyckoff, Director of Programs. DISCLAIMER This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the USAID or the United States Government.
  • 5. CONTENTS Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................1 I. Hate Speech as Early Warning Monitoring, Intervention, and Mitigation.................................................2 Best Practices: Creating a Functioning Media Monitoring System.........................................................11 II. The Role of Secure Human Rights Documentation in Atrocity Prevention..........................................14 III. The Role of Transitional Justice in Atrocity Prevention........................................................................20 Worksheet: Map of Transitional Justice Responses...............................................................................28 IV. Justice Sector Interventions in Atrocity Prevention .............................................................................29 V. The Role of National Human Rights Institutions and Paralegals in Atrocity Prevention.......................46
  • 6. Introduction Atrocity crimes – including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity – which are marked by the large-scale and deliberate targeting of civilians, are violations that particularly offend the collective consciousness and are acts that countries around the globe have agreed to prevent and punish. Unfortunately, notwithstanding international treaty commitments, or the 2005 affirmations by heads of state of their “responsibility to protect” against these offenses, these crimes continue to happen all too often, both during and outside armed conflict. The diverse circumstances that lead to atrocities are often rooted in grievances that escalate to drivers and immediate triggers of atrocity. Core grievances vary across societies and may include ethnic and religious divisions, resources and border disputes, income inequality, lack of access to justice, legacies of past conflicts, impunity, systematic inadequacy of government response, authoritarian or dictatorial government and the oppression or neglect of vulnerable communities. Unaddressed grievances that fester may escalate to become “drivers of atrocity” such as hate speech or particularly conspicuous cases of impunity. Preventing atrocities is a complex and dynamic challenge particularly in societies marked by conflict, grievance, and distrust. Efforts by international actors, such as USAID, to prevent atrocities can take many forms – ranging from long-term upstream prevention, to immediate crisis responses, to post- atrocity response. The five chapters presented in this toolkit (1) introduce foundational topics such as hate speech, early warning, documentation, transitional justice, justice sector interventions, and the role of national human rights institutions and paralegals; (2) provide valuable case studies and lessons learned for USAID missions; (3) and outline opportunities for future USAID atrocity prevention programming. Together, the topics discussed in this toolkit are intended to help raise awareness among USAID staff of these disciplines and their vital linkages to atrocity prevention. This toolkit was prepared by Freedom House, ABA ROLI, Global Rights, and Internews drawing upon their unique technical expertise to outline tools and approaches to support atrocity prevention. Each chapter presents a different critical aspect of atrocity prevention designed to inform the development of an Atrocity Prevention Toolkit for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) field missions. 1
  • 7. I. Hate Speech as Early Warning Monitoring, Intervention, and Mitigation Hate speech – speech that incites or advocates hatred against an individual or group – has been used throughout history to mobilize people towards violence for political ends. The Nazi party used its tabloid and government radio to demonize Jews, preparing an environment in which six million people could be killed simply based on their identity. Sixty years later, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic used radio and television to systematically spread fear among Serbs about the theoretical threat posed by neighboring Croats and Bosnian Muslims, “mobilizing the nation for what became a pre- emptive genocide. 1 ” Croat and Bosnian Muslim ultranationalists similarly spread hate propaganda to mobilize their sides, creating a vicious three- way civil war. Around the same time in ethnically- polarized Rwanda, certain government and private radio, TV, and tabloids called minority Tutsis traitorous ‘cockroaches,’ branding Tutsis as part of a plot to overthrow the radical Hutu government. Mass killings began, with some media outlets serving as tools for recruiting and coordinating operations.2 In the current decade, hate speech also has led to violence in countries with different political systems and levels of development. When the 2007 Kenyan elections were disputed, partisan militias attacked rivals who themselves launched counter-attacks. Local FM radio and personal text messages inflamed the conflict by spreading 1 Kemal Krspahic, Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace (Washington, DC: USIP Press Books, 2003), accessed July 31, 2014, and Kemal Kurspahic, “Bosnia: Words Translated Into Genocide,” accessed July 31, 2014. 2 See, generally, Allan Thomson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, accessed July 31, 2014. rumors, such that 1,100 people died and nearly 500,000 people were displaced. During Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 political crisis, minority Uzbeks temporarily allied with northern Kyrgyz elites. Southern Kyrgyz rivals targeted Uzbeks with hate speech in print periodicals, unleashing violence that killed several hundred Uzbeks and displaced 400,000. In Burma, following its 2011 political liberalization, Buddhist chauvinists have demonized the Muslim minority through vitriolic anti-Muslim sermons distributed via DVDs. Facebook and other social media also spread misinformation about Muslims, such as false claims of a Muslim rape of a Buddhist woman, which has led to violence.3 I. HOW DO WE DEFINE HATE SPEECH? As we look at how speech can lead to violence and what to do about it, we will use several terms. These include hate speech, incitement, and dangerous speech -- terms grounded in international law as well as widely discussed in academia and civil society. Because there is a legal basis for these terms, there are corresponding legal obligations. The State has a fundamental obligation to prevent incitement to violence. However, this comes into tension with State obligations also to protect freedom of expression. One way to handle this tension has been to create specific definitions of different types of speech. Hate speech, as defined by the Council of Europe, covers all forms of expression which “spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.” Incitement, according to 3 Mizzima. July 21, 2014. “Rape claim that sparked Mandalay unrest was fabricated, says state media” accessed July 31, 2014. 2
  • 8. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is “advocacy of hatred on prohibited grounds that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” A related term is dangerous speech. According to hate speech specialist Susan Benesch, this is an act of speech4 that has a reasonable chance of catalyzing or amplifying violence by one group against another, given the circumstances in which it was made or disseminated. II. HOW CAN HATE SPEECH LEAD TO VIOLENCE? These definitions help us identify what kind of speech to be concerned about and what to do about it. Hate speech by itself cannot cause violence. Other contextual factors are always in play. One determinant factor is the presence of political conflict, whether latent as in a transition situation or active during rebellion or civil war. The United Nations Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect cite eight factors relevant to conditions where hate speech can lead to mass violence:5 • History of discrimination or human rights violations against a group. • Lack of legislative protections, responsive judiciary, and independent media, or lack of access to them by groups. • Presence of illegal arms or illegal armed elements. • Motivation of leading actors; actions towards division on basis of ethnic, racial, religious, gender or national identity. • Precipitating actions or factors, such as distribution of arms or decrees on language. 4 Speech includes any form of expression, including images such as cartoons, drawings, photographs, video, film, etc. 5 Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, “Analysis Framework,” accessed July 31, 2014. • Existence of genocidal acts, even if isolated, based on identity, such as killing, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, or denial of basic human needs. • Evidence of intent “to destroy in whole or in part,” including gross violations of human rights, brutality, destruction of symbols, or targeted elimination. • Triggering factors, such as elections, change of government, onset of armed hostilities, or natural disasters. These factors need not all be present nor should this framework serve as a checklist. The National Intelligence Council has produced an internal US Government framework on atrocities. Other frameworks, such as USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework and the NGO Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index, provide additional insights on conditions enabling hate speech to lead to violence. More specifically, the enabling environment for hate speech in media might include: • Centralized control by political authorities. • Punishment or limitation of existence or capacity of independent media through licensing, taxation, and control of availability of newsprint or broadcast spectrum. • Direct or indirect ownership of media by political factions. • Lack of public access to credible information, including government documentation. • Lack of public access to a variety of views, including views produced external to the country. III. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ADDRESS HATE SPEECH WHILE PRESERVING FREE EXPRESSION? Much can be done to address hate speech, 3
  • 9. particularly when it is tracked and analyzed. This enables early warning and action in the face of potential violence, and creation of dossiers of evidence for post-violence prosecution of people who incited violence. Below are some actions that seek to counter hate speech by increasing available information and fostering freedom of expression in polarized or restricted environments: 1. Increase the number of independent media voices available. This usually requires funding by external donors. It will be politically sensitive and likely resisted by the government. 2. Raise awareness about what constitutes hate speech/dangerous speech, its impact on society, and the precedence for perpetrators to be indicted and prosecuted. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Criminal Court cases on Kenya are two examples. 3. Educate media workers with programs such as those of media development NGO Internews. This may include training for journalists to foster sensitivity for context and inclusivity of voices, as well as programs on data journalism that provide ground-truth accuracy to counter rumor. 4. Support civil society organizations that fact-check media stories, like, a vital antidote to misinformation in Ukrainian media. 5. Produce and disseminate information or messaging to counter hate speech. Search for Common Ground has pioneered the use of video story-telling for peace and reconciliation. In Kenya’s 2013 elections, Sisi ni Amani Kenya produced peace messaging and disseminated it as text messages via local, credible leaders— including informal leaders, such as market women and taxi drivers. 6. Use technology to create alternate platforms when avenues are prohibited or threatened. When Slobodan Milosevic prevented traditional media from broadcasting information about pro- democracy protests in Serbia in 1996, independent Radio B92 went around the ban by going online with their news. Tech entrepreneurs are testing and deploying new circumvention tools constantly. There are also more extreme options that governments – both of the country in which the conflict is occurring as well as external stakeholders – can take immediately to try to defuse an imminent crisis. However, these actions run the risk of setting adverse precedents. If used, they should be grounded in the rule of law or have the approval of national, regional or international mechanisms. 1. Establish an inter-agency steering committee to mobilize governmental resources and foster awareness about hate speech. Prior to its 2013 election, Kenya brought together officials from the Ministry of Communications, public prosecutor, and National Cohesion and Integration Commission. At weekly press conferences it identified and shamed those it felt were propagating hate speech, and reportedly developed dossiers for potential prosecution of individuals. (Unfortunately, the Steering Committee operated opaquely, without foundation in law, appeared to go after individual voices rather than officials, and appeared to have forced hate speech offline rather than end it.) 2. Halt broadcasts temporarily. Kenya did this in December 2007 when the winner of the presidential vote was still 4
  • 10. undecided. Rather than ratchet down tensions, many observers have argued this further polarized parties and led to the conflict. This action should be a last resort, should done in a non-arbitrary and non- partisan fashion, and should operate with transparency. 3. Consider external broadcasts into the territory, particularly when the sovereign government is unwilling or has lost ability to address hate speech. When independent news was shut down inside Serbia, the U.S. deployed FM transmitters to neighboring countries to broadcast Western news to Serbians. 4. Block transmissions or destroy broadcast capacity. To be credible, such action should have a legal basis and international support. The 1999 U.S. bombing of Radio Television Serbia was criticized internationally for its lack of proportionality as well as the precedent it set. By contrast, the lack of action – and legal justifications for avoiding doing so – by the U.S. and French in taking out Radio- Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) transmitters in Rwanda in 1994 is seen as a grave failure. IV. HOW CAN IT BE MONITORED? A key component of addressing hate speech is to monitor its use, reach, effects, and the ways it is spread. This is where monitoring of media comes in, as it provides the early warning data to understand if and how hate speech is turning into dangerous speech. USAID officers should be aware of the decisions that must be made when designing a media monitoring system. Both online and manual components usually are needed, as well as skilled staff to input data as well as analyze results. Media monitoring is complex, requires sophisticated analysis, and therefore requires extensive training. All of these components require significant funding and time. It is important to remember that the medium and platforms used for hate speech are not static. Where the Nazis used party and official newspapers, the Serbs used television, the Rwandans and Kenyans used popular talk shows and music programs, and radical Buddhists in Burma distribute DVDs or share videos on YouTube. In many cases, particularly when groups are preparing the social environment for violence, the language and topics may appear fairly innocuous or say what everyone is already feeling, and are thus unremarkable to many including governing authorities. Also, the spread of technology has contributed to the production of hate beyond borders; indeed, Kenyans in the Diaspora spread rumors on social media surrounding the 2007 violence, and radical Buddhists in Sri Lanka have been alleged to have produced content for their radical brethren in Burma. 1. Identify the actors and/or events that should be tracked. When monitoring actors, track not only what the key actors say themselves (primary data), but also what is said about them (secondary data) as a measure of their support. 5
  • 11. What to monitor? When to monitor? Why? Possible actions Actor-based monitoring Identify and track key people: politicians, military leaders, journalists, bloggers Ongoing Know who is using speech or mentions of speech to incite violence • Peaceful counter- messaging • Document for prosecution Event-based monitoring Track streams of information around key events such as elections Weeks and months before and after key events Understand correlations between events and violence • Implement possible interventions depending on the threat level of the speech 2. Decide which media to monitor. Many types of media can be monitored: radio, print, TV, social media and Internet sources. The media landscape is changing, particularly in developing countries, so media monitoring systems must be able to adapt to shifts. For example, in Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, social and online media popularity is increasing rapidly, so these media must be built into any monitoring effort. On the other hand, while radio has great influence in the dissemination of messages of both violence and peace, many radio stations have no online presence. Monitoring systems therefore must include manual input components to capture that data. Importantly, the media most frequently used to disseminate hate speech may not be the most impactful. For example, Freedom House found in Cote d’Ivoire that print was most commonly used for hate speech, but the communication forms with most audience impact were radio, community infiltration by the army and militia gangs, and political bases/ meetings. 3. Identify the language or languages to be tracked, including local dialects. 4. Identify the key words or phrases that are particularly relevant, including potentially “coded” messages. Be aware that some actors call for peace publicly, but use inciting language in private. Consider tracking efforts at reconciliation and tolerance as well. 5. Create a country-specific analytical framework to determine the type of speech (neutral, hate speech, or dangerous speech) as well as the level of threat it poses. 6. Identify and prepare for conflict prevention activities based on analysis of data. V. Case studies In 2013-2014, USAID funded a Dangerous Speech Project to create an early warning methodology using Internet and social media data on hate and dangerous speech in countries vulnerable to mass-scale violence. It was based on the premise that tracking speech will enable both early warning of potential violence and ways to limit violence by restricting the dangerousness of speech – all without curbing freedom of expression. Freedom House and Internews were two of the implementing partners on this project. Freedom House In 2013, Freedom House started its project by 6
  • 12. bringing in Mediabadger, a small analytical firm, to do a scoping study using its own online search engine to identify incidents of violence and attempt trace the violence back to speech itself. A scoping study is a collection and review of preliminary data in order to identify trends and gaps. An event-based scoping study initially was done in Kenya, using key words to try to connect the event to the speech that preceded it. Freedom House and Mediabadger developed a set of words to search for, such as “vermin” or other words degrading groups of people, which the search engine captured and an analyst assessed for level of threat. While Freedom House and Mediabadger were not able to connect events to causal speech, they did identify many trends regarding speech in Kenya – including a surprising amount of peaceful counter-messaging. Freedom House and Mediabadger then conducted two more scoping studies of Zimbabwe and Cote D’Ivoire, this time focusing on political actors, heads of military, and others. In these actor-based studies, key personalities were selected in each country and their online profiles mapped: their visible networks, what they posted and what others posted about them, a qualitative analysis of the kinds of content they generated or the responses they received, and an analysis of possible connections between their online activities and the broader political and security climate in each country. Data sets were generated based on a list of keywords and phrases compiled collaboratively by Freedom House and Mediabadger. The initial scoping studies did not show direct causality between dangerous speech and instances of violence, most likely because other data points would be needed to do so. However, they did reveal the complexity of the issues involved in tracking dangerous speech as well as the resulting need for much greater funding to create a robust early warning system. Actor-based speech monitoring appeared to show the greatest promise. Freedom House also undertook to create a dangerous speech monitoring methodology, using the format of its Freedom of the Press reports. They created a set of questions, each with guidance on how to score on a 1-100 scale. The methodology was fed by Susan Benesch’s work on different aspects of speech that can make it dangerous. To finalize the methodology, Freedom House conducted meetings in Zimbabwe and Cote Aspect of Speech Sample Analytical Questions Speaker and his/her influence over an audience Does the speaker have power or influence over the audience? Is the speaker charismatic? Susceptibility of the audience (listeners of hate speech statement) Are they in fear of the speaker, or excessively deferential? Are they uneducated and misinformed and thus easily manipulated? Are they marginalized, poor or desperate? Content of the speech Is the content inflammatory, with hints or direct calls to violence against another group? Is the content offensive, for example describing the victims- to-be as other than human (e.g. as vermin, pests, insects or animals)? Social and historical context of the speech Are there underlying tensions between the groups? Are there prior examples of hate speech- driven violence against a group? The means of spreading the speech Was the message communicated via a convincing medium – especially one with no competing/contrasting views? Was the message repeated frequently, adding to its power? 7
  • 13. d’Ivoire to get participants’ views on what to track. In Cote d’Ivoire, Freedom House held a workshop with a group of CSOs, journalists, and members of the media regulatory authority. Through an interactive session using a sample blog to test the analytical process, participants provided feedback on both the clarity and relevance of the questions as well as the objectivity of the scoring. Best practices in setting up a media monitoring methodology are found at the end of this chapter. Internews In 2013, Internews sponsored media monitoring for hate speech in Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Burma over several months. Given the unique historical situations presented by each country, it was decided not to use one methodology across the three countries. While this might have potential comparative value, it would also miss important local context. Further, in Kenya both entities implementing the monitoring had established methodologies, as had the organization in Kyrgyzstan. However, in Burma, given the limited number of CSOs focused on media, Internews not only had to develop a methodology, but essentially had to create a media monitoring unit from the ground up. In Kenya, the groups monitored for the existence of hate speech surrounding two potential flashpoints: the International Criminal Court cases against the current Kenyan president and vice president and FM presenter, as well as the process of devolution of power established in the 2010 Constitution. One entity, the Citizen Watchdogs, monitored news and political talk shows on local radio in five communities which had been sites of violence in 2007. They did so using an innovative application for mobiles phones using software by OpenDataKit. Monitors in various locations would listen to a late-night talk show, key in basic data about the program and terms used, and transmit the data to a central server at Internews offices in Nairobi. The second Kenya monitor, Umati, a project of Ushahidi, monitored for hate speech in the online space for months prior to the election—social media, blogs, and online comment sections of news sites – with a methodology incorporating Susan Benesch’s Dangerous Speech framework. Umati developed an automated tool to screen for key terms. This reduced the intense physical and emotional demand on human monitors, as well as their expense. Umati released their results in a public event and set up a social media site to continue the discussion of findings online. The Kyrgyzstan monitor, Network of Social Mediators Media Monitoring Group, had previously used a methodology to monitor media in southern Kyrgyzstan for inter-communal conflict for the National Endowment for Democracy. While the monitoring results were not publicly released due to local sensitivities, the substantive and procedural findings were incorporated into curricula for journalists at the School of Peacemaking and Media Technology in Central Asia. In Burma, where media-related CSO capacity is low, Internews contracted a small, Yangon-based political and policy communications organization with significant training in democracy and governance. The Internews coordinator interviewed local cultural, religious and political leaders to inform the context and terms for the monitoring, then devised media monitoring forms and trained the team. Given the relative inexperience of the Yangon staff and the ongoing tensions in the country, the project created an‘audit’ group based in Mandalay to check the primary team’s work for bias. The results of the findings were released in briefings for select groups of media journalists and editors; diplomats, NGOs and donors; and community and government leaders. 8
  • 14. VI. Lessons learned/best practices Key findings related to the overall concept and dynamics of media monitoring include: • Given its potential for tracking all manner of issues, media monitoring is beneficial for a broad range of societies, but particularly conflict or post-conflict countries. • Media monitoring can track instances of incitement to violence; however, there is not always a causal relationship between instances of incitement and acts of violence. • Incitement in the media often follows rather than precedes instances of violence, serving to ‘fan the flames.’ In Burma, people posted hate-filled comments on Facebook pages about various incidents that further inflamed the situation. • Monitors have a sensitive role in alerting authorities when they find instances of incitement that could lead to violence. Ethical guidelines are needed to ensure the proper balance between rights, particularly freedom of expression, and security. • Benefits and challenges of local and external actors need to be carefully weighed. Local actors know the context and language, which aids speed and accuracy of monitoring. Their involvement increases their ownership of the process and assuages sensitivity caused by outside monitoring. However, involvement of outsiders can be another tool for local activists (such as appeals to the Commission on Human Rights) and can also add credibility to the claim (such as engaging with local embassies and NGOs). International actors can help when the situation is too sensitive for local organizations safely to monitor. • Publicity has pros and cons. While publicity about the monitoring and its findings can have social and governance benefits, in particularly sensitive conflict situations it might be advisable to avoid publicity. Key findings related to specific needs, programming, and operationalizing include: • Addressing significant definitional challenges in the field. There is not a universal definition of hate speech; it is highly context specific. Moreover, as indicated above, scholars such as Susan Benesch have differentiated speech based on intent and capacity. Codifying hate speech is a challenging undertaking and can be seen as a partisan act. Unlike the U.S., many states around the world prohibit such speech in whole or in part, while employing different definitions or thresholds. Kenya’s definition is codified in its 2008 National Cohesion and Integration Act. Yet despite significant public debate around hate speech in advance of the 2013 elections, questions about what qualified as hate speech and how to enforce it prevailed, with some political actors labeling partisan speech as hate. • Monitoring of media for incitement to violence can itself be seen as a provocative endeavor in countries in conflict. While potentially useful to prevent violence, identifying entities that engage in incitement might lead to threats or attacks on the monitors. Therefore, consideration should be given to local sensitivities. • Media monitoring is complex, requires sophisticated analysis and therefore extensive training. In societies in or emerging from conflict, there is often little indigenous capacity to undertake such complex work. 9
  • 15. • Media monitoring programs face the same challenges of other media development programs including o Media literacy on the part of audiences, as well as journalists, i.e., ability to distinguish fact, opinion, sources o General organizational development including issues ranging from training to payroll and grants management o Limited number of local staff with the skills to undertake this work o Limited ability in English or other donor languages o Infrastructure limitations including availability and cost of connectivity and technology as well as a limited or intermittent power grid Key findings related to overall media monitoring program and policy responses include: • For most extreme cases, develop standards for when government might intervene in situations of media incitement to violence. • • Given the effectiveness of regional examples in prompting change in countries, develop norms on responses to hate speech that foster freedom of expression regionally and support exchange on media accountability and professionalism. • Support research by civil society to identify who pays for bloggers, online commenters, and others who incite. Internews Kenya produced a report on political ownership of media in advance of the 2013 elections that highlighted the links between owners of traditional media and political actors. • Engage journalists, editors, publishers, their trade unions and associations to establish codes of conduct on speech and incitement: on professional and personal responsibilities of journalists; reporting, editing and publicizing of stories; online comment sections. • Train journalists on news-gathering and professional standards to avoid sensationalism and counter spread of hate and intolerance in media. o Using ‘data journalism’ approach to ground stories in facts and data, including documentation obtained under access to information laws o Using ‘conflict sensitive journalism’ approach to understand origins of conflict and broaden the views and sources in articles • Enhance capacity of investigative journalism as prevention tool by fostering partnerships between non-traditional partners such as media, civil society organizations, and even libraries. This will help deepen the complexity of reporting and analysis as well as reduce the vulnerability of journalists and their organizations. 10
  • 16. Best Practices: Creating a Functioning Media Monitoring System Monitoring the media can be a helpful tool in efforts to prevent violence. Be aware that there are several components to a media monitoring system, all of which together require significant time and resources. Both online and offline components usually are needed, as well as skilled staff to both input data as well as analyze results. Media monitoring is complex and requires sophisticated analysis and therefore requires extensive training—and re-training—on definitions of hate speech and methodologies. In societies in conflict or emerging from conflict, there is often very little indigenous capacity to undertake such complex and sophisticated work. In using media monitoring for early warning purposes, it is important to track patterns. One is an increase in hate speech over neutral speech, and an increase in dangerous speech over hate speech. Others are changes of positions of previously neutral actors, changes in the choice of language or medium, and increases in use of coded language that could be used to incite violence. Analysis of comments of visitors to key actors’ sites can be a useful barometer of how widely accepted the key actor’s message is, what networks they reach, and what the potential for violence is. Increasing frustration and hostility found in such comments can be early warning indicators. Often the most dangerous speech is used at events such as political rallies or funerals, rather than via coverage in new or traditional media. Be alert to recordings made at these events. Also be alert to the fact that hate speech and dangerous speech may be communicated through subordinates, as top officials may be wary of being on record. Be alert to the fact that there is a trend from old media to new media, so the system should take this into account. Following are best practices in setting up the monitoring system: Monitoring system data parameters best practices: • Adapt the system to the national or regional context o Identify what sociological, political, and historical relationships exist between speech and violence; this includes stigmatizing or dehumanizing language (such as when Hutu leaders referred to Tutsis as “cockroaches”), coded language (such as the “go to work” directives that unleashed killings during the Rwandan genocide), and language that stokes fears of another group and creates a justification for pre-emptive violence. o Understand what words as well as languages are used for what types of speech (sometimes dangerous speech is most often given in local dialect) o Understand trends in Internet usage (who, using what, with what message). o Understand spill-over from one medium to next. o Think about rhythms of conflict, when and how different groups will start to weigh in more heavily with messages of either violence or peace, and be prepared to track accordingly. o Determine who has access to different types of speech, and how receptive they are likely to be. • Track key actors, as these offer a more effective avenue to relevant data than tracking events o Those who link constituencies, both in role of inciter (for monitoring) and as peacemaker (for involvement in solutions) o Those most likely to speak dangerously and carry out implied threats 11
  • 17. o Those who are able to report most accurately on growing tensions • Track implementing as well as strategic actors. Higher level strategic actors tend to use less hate and dangerous speech, but set the context; implementing level actors provide clues for potential specific instances of violence • Integrate the system into a broader analytical and response mechanism, using online but also offline sources of information. o Calls for action towards planned mass violence usually take place along internal, hierarchical communication lines rather than than through public media. Understand these communication lines and determine how to monitor them. o Understand other sources of information to monitor such as opinion polls, hate crime rates, and other. • Ensure the system can adapt to changing language and emerging actors. • Monitor positive messaging fully as well, for its potential use to reduce tensions and avoid conflict. • Create at least four gradations of threat levels so as to be able to point to elevated threat levels without causing undue alarm Numbers of hits, likes, and retweets indicate the resonance of a particular message or event. They can also indicate if someone is trying to expand their audience to reach more people, a trend important to track in a potential incitement case. Others’ accounts of key actors indicate the intensity of regard of their followers and detractors, and can paint a picture of emerging leaders and networks of supporters/ deputies. Deletions of accounts or content indicate attempts to control messaging, either by the actor him- or herself, a website administrator, government, or opponents. Analysis of the time allocated by broadcast media indicates partiality or bias in coverage, as well as potentially how much people will be shaped by often-repeated messages. Monitoring system application possibilities: • Identify and monitor emerging trends of new terms, expressions, actors or geographical references; how best/earliest to detect these changes in tone or actors – bloggers v traditional news likely • Conduct comparative research of current trends against past patterns of keyword frequency, mentions or discussions related to strategic and operational actors, known thematic or geographic flashpoints; emerging actors as well as ones becoming discredited and therefore no longer as relevant, tones changing from violent to peaceful and back, and other • Analyze media or public’s reactions to events, speeches, posts and comments • Create body of evidence for follow-on hate/dangerous speech investigations by national or international authorities; • Analyze influencers and their networks in- situ and among the diaspora • Monitor and analyze positive or counter- messaging to gauge its effectiveness and potential for direct or indirect intervention on the part of the monitoring organization, its 
 partners or others • Illustrate data in a meaningful and impactful way • Design and implement conflict prevention interventions at local, national and regional levels (calls by leaders for calm and/or protection of innocents, blocking or creating consequences for those disseminating hate speech) o Create a hate/dangerous speech awareness campaign 12
  • 18. o Create counter messaging or discredit speakers o Create an alarm network that allows civil society to share incidences of dangerous speech and develop creative and non-violent solutions. Involve local civil society, government, law enforcement actors, as well as international actors such as embassies. Monitoring system configuration best practices: • User-friendly dashboard that allows for easy entry of search terms and parameters and displays results through easy-to- understand visualizations. 
 • Browser-based platform accessible to end-users with Internet access. • Data streams which include all publicly available Internet data, such as online news media and reader commentary; social media (social networks, blogs, micro-blogs, forums, chat groups, video and photo sharing sites); publicly available statistical databases from public sources such as international organizations, national or local governments, NGOs, as well as internal/private data, such as locally collected and analyzed data, such as field or situations reports; and, institutional data from central databases or partner organizations • Operational in stand-alone mode (i.e. not dependent on other specialized software platforms); • Able to collect and process data in different languages • Bandwidth requirements kept to a minimum Additional Resources on Hate Speech United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: Speech, Power, Violence (2009 seminar on cases of hate speech and violence) Voices That Poison (website of scholar Susan Benesch focusing on ‘dangerous speech’) Genocide Prevention Task Force (sponsored by US Institute of Peace, US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and American Academy for Diplomacy; report released 2008) US Institute of Peace Media Conflict and Peacebuilding 13
  • 19. II. The Role of Secure Human Rights Documentation in Atrocity Prevention Mass atrocities are highly dynamic events often marked by uncertainty in their true scope until days, months, or sometimes even years later. Local doctors, emergency workers, journalists, and human rights defenders are a vital resource for documenting crimes and ensuring that what happened will not be lost to time or obfuscated by the perpetrators. In July 2014, a former Syrian military police forensic photographer, known publically as Caesar, testified before the U.S House Foreign Affairs Committee. His identify hidden from cameras by dark sunglasses, a baseball cap, and hooded jacket – he spoke about the overwhelming photographic evidence of war crimes he smuggled out of Syria. By providing over 50,000 photographs documenting an estimated 11,000 individuals killed and tortured by the Bashar al Assad regime to international investigators the suffering of those killed is made known and justice has a greater chance to be delivered. Since the Nuremburg trials of 1945, the international community has made great efforts to dissuade and prevent future atrocities around the world by seeking prosecution and punishment for grievous acts, and attempting to eliminate a confidence in impunity by those who might instigate, lead, or participate in such crimes. While Caesar is unique in that he documented crimes while employed by the regime perpetrating them, unlike the scores of human rights organizations around the world which take great risks to conduct independent documentation, Caesar is a high profile example of the critical need to document crimes which can be hidden by perpetrators, as well as an example of the great personal risk undertaken by those who engage in such work. Local civil society and human rights defenders, in particular, play a vital role in identifying, investigating, and documenting violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as in early warning and urging early response. They also play an important function in pressing their governments and societies to better respect, protect, and promote human rights, helping to reduce the threat of future conflict and mass atrocities. In many cases, where a conflict is still ongoing, or where perpetrators still walk the streets with impunity, the task of collecting and reporting information can be dangerous. However, ensuring that human rights violations are documented and reported is an important element of an atrocity prevention strategy in that it helps combat a sense of impunity by perpetrators, can deliver justice and a renewed Entrance to the documentation office of a local human rights organization in Bamako, Mali. 14
  • 20. sense of social inclusion for victims, and serve as an early warning network of renewed instability. Atrocities rarely occur in states where the rule of law is robust and both police and courts are seen as capable and impartial. Whether atrocities are carried out by a government or by non-state actors, perpetrators often rely on confusion over the facts of their actions to evade accountability. The desire to take away that impunity in order to make high or low-level perpetrators reconsider their participation in violence is an element of both ending an atrocity and preventing acts in the future. Local human right defenders, equipped with mobile communications technologies, can serve as a vital dispersed network throughout a country to document atrocity crimes and report that information to both national and international actors. Additionally, these established networks can act as an early warning network to relay immediate reports of violence to third parties who may be able to act to raise a warning, or work with the host government or international parties to address the situation before an atrocity occurs. CONSIDERATIONS OF SECURE DOCUMENTATION Frontline human rights organizations and lawyers are often the first to collect detailed accounts of crimes and testimonies of victims. USAID Mission personnel and others can utilize the work of local human rights defenders and their analysis to feed into early warning and response. The documentation produced also supports accountability and truth telling goals for the future. Ad described later in this chapter, USAID can play a vital role supporting the work of human rights defenders in every region of the world through funding and technical assistance support. Two recent case studies of human rights documentation work underway in Mali and an East African country6 highlight on-the-ground considerations of secure human rights documentation work: 1. Human rights documentation, during or after an atrocity, is best conducted by local investigators. In interviews, both Malian and East African human rights defenders (HRDs) emphasized the importance and value of having monitors from the local community or region where abuses occurred. Being local brings numerous benefits both in terms of information gathering and security. Local HRDs are generally well- networked in their region, allowing them to know where crimes have been committed and gather reports of new violations as they happen. Their local knowledge also helps them evaluate information. In many cases they know the reliability or reputation of sources. In some cases they may have witnessed the crimes themselves or already heard reports of the violation from multiple other sources before they interview victims, allowing them to immediately corroborate the information. Additionally, local investigators have the ability to blend in and work “under the radar,” speak the local dialect, and can travel to areas which might be off limits to international observers, such as the United Nations or African Union. Security precautions are paramount so that the local monitor is not exposed and that perpetrators, who may still live in the community, do not learn of their documentation work. In one case in Mali, a local monitor was deliberately targeted and attacked by a local militia group for his documentation work, underscoring the need for well-developed security protocols both for the monitors, and the information they collect. Fortunately, in this example, because a security plan was in place, the extended documentation network quickly learned about the attack and was able to respond immediately to provide medical assistance. 6 Country name withheld due to security concerns. 15
  • 21. Documentation and Reporting: East Africa Scenario Monitors of the human rights organization learn of the possible presence of a mass grave that could be connected to recent disappearances of area residents. The site is within visible range of a checkpoint maintained by a local militia. Creating the appearance of simply passing through on the way to another farm, the monitor nonchalantly walks by the site with a farmer. The brief visit is sufficient to confirm the site to be a recently dug mass grave large enough to hold 6 or more bodies. The monitor covertly snaps several photos of key indicators that the site is a mass grave. The monitor is also able to reliably record the site’s location based on landmarks with a margin of error of only a few yards, and the time when the mass grave first appeared to within days. Due to the presence of the checkpoint, it is highly inadvisable for the monitor to attempt to collect forensic evidence from the mass grave. Upon confirming with reasonable confidence that the site is a mass grave and that the location and time of appearance corresponds with recent disappearances, the monitor’s work is done. The organizations then reports that information to external human rights organizations as well as appropriate international or government officials, particularly an official with an appropriate mandate to further investigate. The documenting organizations should not be expected or encouraged to do anything more than that, thereby safeguarding its role in detecting and documenting atrocities. 2. Establish a clear research methodology and documentation standard A critical element of human rights documentation is for the human rights organization and its monitors to agree on and establish a consistent research method for the collection of information and on the intended use of that information. Questions to answer include: Will the information be used for national or international advocacy and raising awareness of the level and types of crimes which occurred? Or is it intended that the information will be used in possible criminal prosecutions? The evidentiary burden and documentation standard of the later will be much higher, and the documentation, analysis, and storage of information must be much more rigorous. If the information is gathered as a part of an early warning mechanism, it is important to plan what type of information serves as proof, how will it be verified and to what degree of certainty, and a plan for timely dissemination. The Malian human rights network sought to collect information for both advocacy and potential future prosecution requiring their monitors to learn new investigation skills and evidentiary standards, offered in USG-funded training programs. In the Malian case, one well-established organization conducting documentation work followed a rigorous documentation and evidentiary standard, which closely hewed to UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights’ 18 principles of human rights documentation. Additionally, because the monitors were allowed them to verify facts and information reported by other local human rights organizations, and encouraged others to share their own detailed information. In East Africa, the monitors – a newly established network of local human rights organizations – acknowledged their limited resources at the beginning of the initiative and established a data collection and reporting strategy appropriate to local logistical constraints. Their documentation 16
  • 22. methodology and verification plan supported the credible reporting of human rights violations collected through interviews with victims – including the types and number of violations – aimed at raising awareness among the population about their rights, and compelling the government to support justice and compensation for victims. In both cases, regardless of the level of supporting evidence collected, accuracy and verification were essential to ensure the credibility of the work, as inaccurate reports could undermine their credibility and call into question their reliability. In both case studies, potential false reports or exaggeration were checked by the local monitors, who employed various techniques to test suspicious claims. Data was also analyzed by a reporting hub office, where information was entered into reporting software. 3. Ensure security of information and analysis In addition to the methodology and intended use, a security protocol for the documentation process and security of the information collected must be established before work begins. As described earlier, local monitors can provide extra security over monitors from outside the region or country, because of their local knowledge and relationships, and ability to blend in. At the same time, local monitors are exposed to ongoing risks because they may live in the community and still engage in work which may upset violent actors. To enhance security and response to monitors at risk, Malian monitors across the country established an SMS communication network with each other, shared their planned daily itinerary with at least one other person before beginning work, and checked-in with the network every two hours while working. Securing the information also poses a challenge. In Mali, monitors recorded information on paper forms and later delivered these forms to reporting hubs to be logged into the secure digital reporting system Martus. Monitors reported frequent concerns about information on the forms being lost before delivery to the hub due to rain or other weather elements, or seizure by local militias or security forces, potentially endangering not just themselves, but the victims who reported the information as well. A separate network of HRDs in Mali reported that their information forms were secured in a locked room or desk drawer at the local headquarters of the collecting organization. The desire to input data directly into a secure electronic database, such as Martus, at the end of each day or during the interview itself, rather than physically delivering forms weeks later, is a priority for information security. However, the lack of electricity and unreliable internet connections in many parts of Mali made this difficult without additional resources, such as laptops for each monitor, and USB sticks enabling internet connections through mobile phone networks.7 4. Develop a communication and advocacy plan A communication and advocacy plan is also necessary to achieve the desired aims of the documentation collection, enabling the documentation to play a role in early warning and public advocacy communicating that atrocity crimes cannot be committed with impunity. Both the Malian and East African case studies highlighted the need to separate the analysis and reporting of information from those doing the documenting. Separating these functions provided the documenting organization an official stance of impartiality which is critical to help protect their personal and organizational security by not appearing to take sides – particularly if engaged in documenting crimes committed by state authorities with the power to harass, fine, or imprison their staff or close the organization. 7 Overtime ICT technology and infrastructure will naturally improve, ideally offering new and more efficient methods for information collection and dissemination. 17
  • 23. Additionally, the importance of describing their work as “documentation” rather than “investigation” was also emphasized, as documentation can be defended as simple information collection, while investigation carries a stronger connotation with the use of that information for prosecution. Collecting evidence of an actual crime can represent a direct threat to the guilty person(s) because it can lead to an indictment and possible conviction. In contrast, documenting and reporting a human rights violation represents a less threatening activity. While it can generate unwelcome attention and pressure on a government to address or stop a violation, it does not involve courts – a distinction is not lost on authorities and non-state actors. In the East African case study country, an individual caught collecting evidence for prosecution can be sentenced at a special court. A documentation organization examined in the East African case only reported the facts they collected and left the analysis and use and interpretation of that information for others. In the Malian study, a communications and advocacy team was assembled, separate from those doing the documentation, to develop a strategy for disseminating the information, which involved both public advocacy and targeted meetings with the national government and international organizations. ACTIONS USAID MISSIONS CAN TAKE TO SUPPORT SECURE DOCUMENTATION AND CONTRIBUTE TO ATROCITY PREVENTION Provide Long-Term Targeted Aid to Support Documentation and Reporting Missions should recognize the importance and value of local organizations and human rights defenders in providing local information and documenting crimes committed in a conflict or atrocity. Organizations in both Mali and East Africa specifically highlighted the need for long- term support to properly sustain and develop their networks and organizations, as well as to enable them to purchase ICT equipment to more securely and efficiently conduct their work. Long- term programmatic assistance to support these organizations during and after atrocities is necessary to fully capture and document crimes committed. Support for, and frequent engagement with, organizations with local documentation networks is important when outbreaks of violence occur as a resource for early warning information. Early warning reports (discussed further in Chapter IV) are useful to track potential precipitous increases in retaliatory violence, or to bring the attention of national and international actors to the situation while opportunities still exist to prevent an atrocity. Support Organizational Capacity and Technical Development Frequently, local human rights organizations, particularly those which have recently formed due to new political openings or, conversely, deepening crises, lack adequate capacity and technical knowledge to operate at international standards. Through programmatic support and training, USAID can support the organizational development of local organizations for complex project and financial management. Capacity development also includes additional resources, including financial support and logistical resources such as secure communications equipment, mobile internet access, computers, rented vehicles for transportation, and possibly even portable generators or solar panels if context appropriate. The case studies in Mali and Eastern Africa emphasize the role that organizational management and financial and logistical support plays in improving the capacity of local organizations to securely document crimes. However, Missions should also be cautious not to expect or encourage groups to take on obligations beyond the scope of their documentation work if it might undermine their local impartiality or security. 18
  • 24. Missions can likewise play a vital role by supporting local organizations to obtain technical expertise. Organizations interviewed in Mali expressed a strong desire to learn international best practices and continue to develop their professional expertise and competence in secure documentation techniques. Missions can engage international organizations and human rights NGOs with relevant technical expertise to work closely with local groups to transfer knowledge and support organizational development. Finally, when local human rights defenders are under threat or harmed, USAID should provide financial support for costs for added protection and defense, and offer solidarity in their dialogues with host governments. Raise Issues of Violations and Impunity at National and International Levels The US government is in a unique position to raise concerns of potentially escalating situations with national governments, and international bodies. USAID should view networks of human rights defenders not only as valuable sources to be supported for the documentation of crimes, but also as potential early warning networks which can alert Missions, and the wider US government, to potentially escalating crises. Missions can utilize documentation or early warning information to inform rapid response to deescalate situations or longer-term programmatic responses to mitigate underlying factors which may lead to an outbreak of violence. Longer-term responses can include organizational support, as described above, as well as justice sector reform programming, including local and national good governance development to support the elimination of impunity and rebuilding the confidence of citizens in their governments as guarantors of their rights. Missions can also share information with State Department and other US government peers to raise the issue of violations publically in high-level statements or through venues such as the Universal Periodic Review process. Information can also be used privately in bilateral meetings with the national government to press for criminal justice or transitional justice processes, as well as compensation to victims. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ON HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION Bickford, et al. 2008. Documenting Truth. International Center for Transitional Justice. Hargreaes, Caroline and Sanjana Hattotuwa. October 2010. “ICTs for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes.” ICT for Peace Foundation. Thompson, Kate and Camille Giffard. 2002. Reporting Killings as Human Rights Violations. Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2011. Manual on Human Rights Monitoring. Available on the OHCHR website’s Policy and Methodological Materials page. 19
  • 25. Diagram 1 III. The Role of Transitional Justice in Atrocity Prevention Transitional justice is now utilized by countries in every region of the world to address legacies of mass human rights abuses and dictatorship. Transitional justice is an important tool for reducing the likelihood of renewed conflict and potential future mass atrocities by providing official recognition and redress to victims, establishing historical truth, achieving accountability for human rights abuses, and rebuilding civic trust. Through mitigating the political and socio- economic grievances which can fuel violent conflict, and establishing new systems of accountability, transitional justice processes should be viewed as critical tools in upstream conflict and atrocity prevention. Additionally, transitional justice process, where they already exist, can potentially be utilized in a crisis situation to deescalate tensions or provide informational inputs to early warning systems. Transitional justice processes represent opportunities for countries to break deadly cycles of violence (see Diagram 1). In countries which did not implement transitional justice processes at key junctures, such as Rwanda immediately following the Arusha Accords or in the Democratic Republic of Congo following the Second Civil War, grievances have festered and grown and have even led to an outbreak of renewed violence and atrocities. Where used, many countries have witnessed positive democratic transformations, notably South Africa and countries of former Yugoslavia. This chapter will briefly outline how to evaluate the needs of a country, as well as the opportunities which exist to support both locally- driven and internationally-supported transitional justice initiatives. WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non- recurrence characterizes transitional justice as “a set of measures that can be implemented to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses, where ‘redressing the legacies’ means, primarily, giving force to human rights norms that were systematically violated. A non-exhaustive list of these measures includes criminal prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, and institutional reform. Far from being elements of a random list, these measures are part of transitional justice in virtue of sharing two mediate goals (providing recognition to victims and fostering civic trust) and two final goals (contributing to reconciliation and to democratization).”8 8 Pablo de Greiff’s “Theorizing Transitional Justice” in Transitional Justice. Nomos Li, (eds.) Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster, NYU Press (2012): 40. 20
  • 26. Transitional justice measures including prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations and institutional reform are contingent parts of a comprehensive transitional justice process whose goals are: 1. Truth: Truth is central to transitional justice; the state has a duty to uncover and expose the truth about the committed crimes, which empowers victims to tell their stories, exposes structural violence, and counters denial and revisionism about the situation surrounding mass human rights violations. 2. Accountability: The state has a duty to ensure that perpetrators of human rights abuses are held accountable for their crimes. Accountability ensures that perpetrators are taken off the streets and out of the political system. Importantly, accountability can also have a deterrent effect on future crimes while also creating support for state institutions. 3. Reparations: While reparations can never make up for the violations that occurred, they can be an important form of official acknowledgment, help victims rebuild their lives, and create faith in state institutions by demonstrating a serious commitment to addressing past crimes. 4. Institutional reform: Institutions that have a legacy of violating human rights must be reformed so that citizens can reestablish trust in the state as the guarantor of their rights. Transitional justice efforts frequently work in concert with and are supported by security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and rule of law reform initiatives including drafting new constitutions, reforming the judiciary and educational institutions. 5. Acknowledgment and memory: Public and official acknowledgment is a crucial element of victims’ rights and a victim-centered approach to transitional justice. Acknowledgment validates victims’ experiences and is important for reconciliation and healing; it can include public apologies, commemorations and memorial centers, among many other measures. While transitional justice efforts originally focused solely on international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, more recently the field has been effectively applied to address histories of long-term human rights violations, including violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. Transitional justice comprises a range of mechanisms to achieve these goals. Many of these mechanisms have the potential to remove human rights abusers from power, deter individuals from participating in future violence or corruption, and create community buy-in to legitimate state institutions. States which implement both retributive (criminal) justice and restorative (healing) mechanisms together in a holistic and complimentary manner will create an even stronger platform for creating a new inclusive, peaceful democratic society. The chart on the next page summaries the mechanisms most frequently utilized to achieve the goals of transitional justice: Transitional justice is “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation.” – Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice 21
  • 27. Mechanism Description Considerations CriminalAccountability Domestic Trials (Examples: Argentina, Peru, Burundi) Prosecutions in the national court system or a special court Can be hard to have a fair trial, domestic legal systems may be weak, can be slow and expensive, high number of perpetrators can overwhelm the system, judges can be corrupt or have little or no support from the police to pursue investigations. Hybrid Tribunals (Examples: Cambodia, East Timor) Ad hoc judicial bodies composed of both international and local judges and prosecutors Adds international expertise and perception of neutrality to domestic courts that are weak or lack public trust. International Trials (Examples: Yugoslavia, Rwanda) International Criminal Court, international tribunals Can act where domestic courts lack will or ability to prosecute, though they are often expensive, slow, and only prosecute top level individuals. TruthCommissions Truth Commissions (Examples: South Africa, Chile) Represents an official acknowledgment of abuses, publically recognizes the suffering of the victims and the crimes committed, some identify perpetrators and recommend prosecutions, may recommend reparations and institutional and legislative reforms May be limited by mandate to a certain time period or certain types of crimes, also may be limited by amnesty laws. No prosecutorial powers. In exchange for information from perpetrators, some truth commissions (e.g. South Africa) have issued individual amnesties, thereby establishing a more complete truth about the atrocities committed. Reparationsand Memorialization Memorialization (Examples: Numerous) Days of remembrance, memorials, public apologies, museums, concerts, films, art, etc. Public, official, state-sanctioned. These measures serve to recognize the dignity and equal worth of victims. Reparations (Examples: Ghana, Morocco, Colombia) Reparations include: individual or collective, financial or symbolic compensation measures, restitution, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non- recurrence. Allows victims to rebuild their lives and their status in the community, demonstrates government acknowledgment of past abuses and commitment to repair. However, victims and families may feel that it is an attempt to buy their silence if not combined with other mechanisms such as trials, truth-commissions, or institutional reforms. Can be difficult to determine who is eligible and state resources may be scarce. Institutional Reform Lustration, Vetting (Examples: Germany, Iraq, Bosnia & Herzegovina) Removal or disqualification of public officials affiliated with the prior regime (lustration) or with a history of human rights violations (vetting) Reforms institutions and helps restore public trust in the government, may address gaps in accountability left by prosecutions. Can create expertise gap in new government. Danger of outright purges of personnel with no due process. Amnesty Amnesty (Examples: Argentina, Chile, Algeria) Legal pardon for crimes, sometimes offered in exchange for truth-telling Individualized amnesties can incentivize perpetrators to provide information about crimes which may not come to light otherwise. Blanket amnesty laws, however, can strengthen impunity. National amnesty laws for international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are considered illegal (Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability, 2013) 22
  • 28. Transitional Justice as Urgent Intervention Though transitional justice processes are generally long-term initiatives which will have their greatest impact as a critical element of upstream conflict prevention, creative opportunities may exist to utilize existing transitional justice processes to head-off a developing crisis situation when the risk of atrocity crimes are high. These opportunities can include: • Information of past conflict and atrocities collected through criminal justice proceedings or truth commissions can contribute to early warning systems by identifying trends, patterns, as well as dangerous speech, which preceded previous atrocities and may augur the outbreak of renewed violence (as outlined in Chapter I). • In cases such as Kenya following the post-election violence in 2008, transitional justice processes were initiated, however, they were poorly communicated to the public and few Kenyans knew of the process, let alone the findings or changes which came as a result. Implementing a rapid communication plan in a tense situation to inform the public, or the particularly aggrieved communities, of the findings and impact (particularly benefits) of past or ongoing transitional justice efforts may play a role in defusing some immediate grievances or demonstrating the government’s commitment to positive change. Official transitional justice processes at the national-level do not occur in a vacuum. It’s equally important to keep in mind the critical person-to-person role played by community-level reconciliation processes. Community-led efforts guided by traditional community practices such as gachaca courts in Rwanda and Fumbol Tok in Sierra Leone are notable examples of the vital role locally-owned justice and reconciliation processes play in advancing broader national transitional justice efforts. Local reconciliation efforts within communities should be considered a necessary, complimentary process to national transitional justice processes. While national transitional justice mechanisms are generally government-supported, official processes, a broader range of activities by international organizations and domestic civil society groups can support and facilitate these processes and advance transitional justice even in pre- and non-transition settings. These include: • Civil society-led documentation of crimes (Cambodia, former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s). • Independent truth commissions and tribunals where governments are unwilling (Iran Tribunal and Truth Commission in London in 2012) • Monitoring, information dissemination, and public education on transitional justice processes by media and civil society groups (Myanmar). • Collection and sharing of victim’s narratives, and public outreach and education campaigns to empower victims/survivors and amplify local and marginalized voices (Indonesia). • Increasing local access to justice through legal advice to victims by paralegals, legal clinics, and civil society groups (Zimbabwe). • Capacity building programs for government employees, and training and assistance for local civil society to support transitional justice efforts and serve as a watchdog of official processes (Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia). 23
  • 29. As most atrocity crimes happen during conflict, transitional justice responses can be used to resolve underlying grievances following a conflict to promote healing within a society. By resolving these grievances, rather than allowing them to fester, grow, and spark renewed conflict, transitional justice can help break ongoing cycles of violence and contribute to a more stable and prosperous future. The following sections outline steps to assess opportunities to support transitional justice processes which will contribute to long-term conflict and atrocity reduction and prevention. ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROGRAMMING Transitional justice processes are a vital tool for reducing the causes of conflict, which contribute to making future violence, and atrocity crimes, less likely. However, transitional justice processes themselves may be contentious and lead to heated public debates as they seek to address sensitive issues of the past, particularly in a divided society. For this reason, both the timing and mechanism of transitional justice responses are context specific and must be informed by the local situation. The steps below can serve as a guide in assessing a situation and identifying areas in which intervention can best support transitional justice. Begin by conducting an in-depth and inclusive assessment of the current transitional setting as outlined in USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework. It is critical to speak directly with various stakeholders including victims, civil society organizations, and traditionally marginalized groups. Local human rights groups can also provide links to victims, as well as marginalized voices outside elite or political circles. Key questions to consider in relation to transitional justice include: • What ongoing grievances (unresolved issues or claims) do each of the actors have against the other parties? • How does the current government view the issue/the past? Do they feel it relates to long-term stability? • How do local civil society groups view the issue/the past? • Are there sincere government-led efforts at political and social reconciliation, or is there political and social domination by one party and/or victor’s justice? Informed by the analysis of the current transitional situation, the next step is to map current, or concluded, transitional justice efforts. Use the attached worksheet (Page 28) to help guide and structure your assessment. Questions to consider include: • Are there currently, or have there been, government-led transitional justice responses in the country? Why or why not? • What period of history, or crimes, did those responses cover? • What responses occurred? • Have there been unofficial responses – community-level efforts – in place of, or in addition to official, state-supported responses? Is civil society supporting the state-led initiatives, is the state reaching out to the civil society? • If these responses have concluded or been ongoing for some time, what has been the impact? • Did justice – such as prosecutions or recognition of crimes – vary by social group, gender, or political affiliation? Has any group been left out of the scope of justice? • If responses have been, or will be, undertaken by the state, are state institutions technically competent and 1. Understand the Current Situation 2. Map Transitional Justice Responses 24
  • 30. publically legitimate enough to achieve their goals? • What, if any, internationally-supported efforts are ongoing to support the transition? Consider both government initiatives and projects by international non-governmental organizations. The assessment of the current situation coupled with the map of transitional justice responses create a framework for identifying opportunities to support effective, locally-owned transitional justice processes, whether it is filling in gaps, supporting ongoing transitional justice efforts, or encouraging and supporting the establishment of that effort. Questions to guide the identification of opportunities and needs that USAID can address include: • Are there official attempts or pressure from citizens to deal with unaddressed grievances and crimes? • Is there popular and political will for dealing with the past? • Are there grievance or crimes which have not been addressed by transitional justice responses? • Are there gaps in the transitional justice response (prosecution of crimes but no public recognition of victims suffering or memorialization; documentation of crimes but no prosecution; lop-sided prosecution only targeting one side in a conflict)? • Is the transitional justice approach holistic, including both retributive (justice and accountability) and reparative (truth, memory, reparations) processes? Is the choice of one approach leaving open the options for another approach in the future? • How have communities responded to national transitional justice processes? Have there been community-level transitional justice or reconciliation efforts? Do community-level grievances remain? To implement potential solutions consider what stakeholders have the potential to create the greatest change to support transitional justice. Who would be the most effective local partners for addressing the needs identified? Think outside the box and consider partners such as: anti- corruption activists, investigative journalists, artists and musicians, reform judges, trade union leaders, women’s groups, victim’s associations and associations of the missing, school teachers, university students, environmental groups, etc. PROGRAMMATIC POSSIBILITIES Given that each situation is unique, the manner or form of transitional justice efforts must be informed by the context specific to the country, though all efforts should follow universally- recognized norms, principles and best practices.9 It is important to listen to, understand, and support the victims/survivors, without compromising universal principles, such as accountability for atrocity crimes. The role of international actors in supporting local transitional justice processes has taken a wide array of forms. The following is an illustrative sample of past transitional justice projects supported by implementers which have promoted truth-telling and accountability, reformed laws and institutions, and advocated for political transformation without resorting to violence: 9 See “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice,” March 2010. 3. Compare the Map of Transitional Justice Responses with the Current Situation to Identify Needs and Strategic Opportunities 25
  • 31. Documentation: Syria’s civil war began from peaceful street demonstrations in 2011 calling for a more democratic state and soon spiraled into a bloody conflict with widespread systematic human rights abuses and likely war crimes. Freedom House, working closely with local partners, implemented a program to support the collection and documentation of mass human rights violations. As a result of these pre-transition efforts, local activists were trained in effective documentation techniques, capturing the widespread abuses of the Bashir regime. Additional international-supported efforts, such as the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center, have worked inside the country to collect, verify, and securely store information and evidence for potential use in future transitional justice criminal processes. Investigation and Public Awareness: 1999 marked the end of Indonesia’s deadly 25 year occupation of East Timor. Following East Timor’s independence in 2002, the State Department engaged the Freedom House-led RIGHTS Consortium to support the reconstruction process, with a particular focus on redressing past atrocities and advancing the public’s understanding of the justice system. RIGHTS partners deployed an expert pool of investigators and prosecutors to support investigations and build cases against individuals accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law. International partners also assisted the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation to increase public awareness of transitional justice mechanisms through a widely distributed, localized three-part video documentary series “The Road to Justice” which captured footage of the reconciliation hearings. Perpetrators saw the hearings as an effective mechanism to be welcomed back into communities, while victims saw them as a culturally relevant, legitimate process for dealing with past violence. Institutional Reform: In the wake of the Tunisian Revolution, which ousted long-serving dictator Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisians found themselves with state institutions marked by the former regime and in need of reform to rebuild public confidence. Addressing this need, Freedom House developed a rule of law reform project to support the establishment of an independent judiciary. Two white papers with policy recommendations for key topics such as prison reform and the relationship between the independent public prosecutor and Department of Justice were prepared with input from a range of stakeholders. Public outreach campaigns and petitions were organized to receive public input and raise awareness of the initiatives, and a series of national conferences were held to discuss the path forward for justice sector reform. As a result of these activists, members of parliament took on the cause of judicial reform and high ranking officials changed their attitude and agreed to start working with civil society to incorporate their recommendations for reform. Enhancing Victims Voices: After a decade marked by conflict and serious human rights violations which split the country in half, Côte d’Ivoire is now looking to address the past and reduce the likelihood of future violence. Freedom House has been working intensively in Cote d’Ivoire with a committee composed of eight civil society organizations to produce a compiled victims’ narrative report. By identifying serious human rights abuses committed by all sides of the political spectrum – such as violations to the right to life, torture and other inhumane treatments, and sexual violence – the compiled report provides unique testimony and a compelling basis from which to advocate for an effective and equitable transitional justice process. 26
  • 32. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ABA Rule of Law Initiative. 2014. Community Participation in Transitional Justice: A Role for Participatory Research. Freedom House. 2013. Delivering Justice Before and After Transitions. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Transitional Justice resources page with links to further references on numerous transitional justice topics. Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution. July 2011. “Briefing Paper: Transitional Justice: Key Concepts, Processes, and Challenges” International Center for Transitional Justice. January 2011. “Making an Impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for Transitional Justice” International Center for Transitional Justice. November 2012. “Engaging Children and Youth in Transitional Justice Processes: Guidance for Outreach Programs” International Center for Transitional Justice. June 2014. “Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?” United Nations. March 2010. “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice” United Nations. August 2004. “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies” 27
  • 33. Type of TJ Mechanism Utilized (list all on separate rows) Mechanism Ongoing or Ended Time Period Covered/ Crimes Addressed Lead Actor Internal Legitimacy Impact If Impact was Limited, Why? Crimes/ Grievances Unaddressed Commission/ Trials/ Vetting/lustration Reparation/etc Memorialization efforts Ongoing/ Ended e.g. 2002-2010/ Crimes during the civil war, but not abuses before the war Nat'l govt, Int'l community, civil society, etc. Your assessment of the mechanisms’ legitimacy among the general local population; public awareness of the process may be one factor to consider Your assessment of the impact of transitional justice responses What else was/is needed? Geographic and temporal categories, as well as specific segments of population Worksheet: Map of Transitional Justice Responses 28
  • 34. IV. Justice Sector Interventions in Atrocity Prevention Preventing atrocities is a vital and difficult challenge particularly in societies marked by conflict, grievance, and distrust. Many interrelated initiatives will be needed. Part of the mix will include well-conceived and conflict- sensitive measures to maximize the useful role that the justice sector can potentially play in helping to prevent atrocities in particular societies. USAID field workers seeking to do so should consider a number of key supporting objectives, as well as practical tools to accomplish them. These key supporting objectives include: 1. Understand the role, and limits, of the justice sector in conflict-affected countries 2. Build effective early warning systems 3. Expand local knowledge of the law and legal remedies 4. Improve justice and accountability mechanisms that can respond effectively to atrocities Many different tools can assist in accomplishing these challenging objectives. These tools include: • A nuanced conflict assessment that examines the strengths and limitations of existing conflict resolution mechanisms, including justice institutions; • Community-based early warning systems and associated training; • Paralegal programs that provide education about rights and remedies, mediation services, and linkages to existing dispute settlement mechanisms; • Mobile courts that can reach remote areas to prosecute atrocities, and special courts that provide an integrated range of services to victims and witnesses; • Synergistic approaches that seek “positive complementarity” between international and domestic efforts, while working to advance “justice on the ground” through meaningful public outreach and engagement and targeted domestic capacity-building I. WHAT IS THE JUSTICE SECTOR? While the rule of law relies on all facets of governance to function, it is the justice sector that is responsible for operationalizing the rule of law. The justice sector has traditionally been interpreted to focus on the legal framework, the judiciary and other state institutions. Justice sector interventions under this top-down view emphasize legal reform and institutional strengthening, mostly through the judiciary. This chapter’s approach follows an emerging trend to broaden the definition of the justice sector beyond a traditional focus, and includes non- state, or informal, justice and security systems, as well as other public and private institutions. Justice sector institutions and actors • Ministries of justice • Legislatures • Police, including non-state mechanisms (security guards, neighborhood watches) • Prisons • Prosecutors’ offices • Legal profession, including public defenders • Judiciary and the courts, including magistrates and higher state courts for civilians and military courts • Council of Chiefs and other traditional leaders, as well as customary or traditional dispute resolution institutions • Oversight organizations, including Human Rights commissions, ombudsmen’s offices • Civil society organizations involved with the justice sector, including legal assistance organizations, legal advocacy organizations, law schools, bar associations and human rights groups
  • 35. In many conflict-affected countries, justice sector institutions and actors are destroyed as a result of violence or civil war, or even lack the capacity to assume basic functions for maintaining order and security. In these situations, in understanding the role and limits of the justice sector, discussed below, USAID field workers should map out who or what entity is in a position to provide a justice sector response to a conflict. II. ELEMENTS OF AN ATROCITY PREVENTION STRATEGY: JUSTICE SECTOR INTERVENTIONS Interventions should take formal and non-state justice and security systems into account as part of a sector-wide strategy. They should aim to strengthen links across the whole justice sector through multi-layered approaches to justice sector reform that engage the public and listen to the voices of the vulnerable. In practice, the tools that the justice sector provides in preventing atrocities have focused on upstream prevention, or long-term approaches, such as the promotion of the rule of law and human rights, which seek to understand and respond to the underlying causes of conflict. The justice sector has not usually been thought to have a role in providing a “real-time” response to immediate crises. This work is left to other measures such as high- level diplomatic missions to mediate between parties or more forceful ones, including deploying peacekeepers to a region. There is, however, an important role that the justice sector can play. Section 2.1, below, provides an illustrative sample of justice sector responses to atrocities, both in terms of time-sensitive action and real-time prevention and response, and in longer-term structural contributions over time. Serious and recurring human rights violations, particularly if they are egregious, may lead to atrocity crimes such as crimes against humanity, and many of the approaches discussed can be useful in addressing serious human rights violations as well as atrocity crimes. 2.1 UNDERSTAND THE ROLE, AND LIMITS, OF THE JUSTICE SECTOR The first step in any effective justice sector intervention is to understand the role, and limits, of the justice sector in conflict-affected countries by incorporating a governance analysis into needs assessment and conflict analysis as outlined in USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework. USAID has developed an extensive governance assessment framework: A Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis: The Rule of Law Strategic Framework. While USAID workers should not limit themselves to the particular questions below, general areas of inquiry regarding governance should consider: • Who holds power and how accountable and transparent are they? • Who or what is capable of providing justice and accountability? • What role does the justice sector play in resolving disputes? Central African Republic: Peacekeepers as Justice Sector Actors In the Central African Republic, where violence against civilians has been pervasive since the overthrow of former President Francois Bozizé in late March 2013 by a rebel alliance, there has been a lack of basic order and security and legitimacy—the country’s standing army, Central African Armed Forces, has been disbanded, and there is no police force or justice system— the regional peacekeeping operation, the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA), has been acting as the legal authority, conducting minimal judicial proceedings. 30

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