EXAMINING PAYMENTS/REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES : EXPERIENCES FROM PRO-POOR REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN...
PRESA Sites
<ul><li>Concepts </li></ul><ul><li>Environmental services </li></ul><ul><li>Biophysical outcomes of proper management of ...
Redirecting development pathways towards environmental integrity Positive incentives are needed to reward rural poor for t...
PRESA SO FAR: Can watersheds be managed sustainably through negotiated agreements between landowners and potential benefic...
REALISTIC <ul><li>RES schemes based on scientifically sound assessment of relationships of land use changes and ES provi...
Impacts of land use change - Kapingazi The impact of land use change on water yield is generally low. Scenario Water yiel...
Effectiveness of landuse practices on hydrology Quantity: Soil and water conservation practices have little effect on wat...
Towards a business case for PWS - Sasumua <ul><li>Grassed waterway (3m width by 20 km length - approx 15 acres) </li></ul...
Pay-back period based on constant cost of allum alone
Increasing value accruing to farmers <ul><li>Alternative payment mechanisms - Ulugurus </li></ul><ul><li>Co-investment pr...
Sediment sources in Sasumua <ul><li>Low erosion rates from the forest </li></ul><ul><li>High rates on some agricultural ar...
VOLUNTARY <ul><li>Both ES providers and beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through free choice at the individual leve...
Are sellers willing to accept payments for ES supply? <ul><li>Farmers willing to accept (WTA) payments for: </li></ul><ul>...
<ul><li>Nairobi water users - 2 o beneficiaries </li></ul><ul><li>Willing to pay higher water tariffs </li></ul><ul><li>...
CONDITIONALITY <ul><li>Performance-based rewards </li></ul>
If performance will not happen without incentives <ul><li>PROVIDERS </li></ul><ul><li>1. Performance is driven by – </li...
PES Paradigms Conditionality <ul><li>CES: C ommoditized E nvironmental S ervices </li></ul><ul><li>Direct interaction ...
WHAT IS THE RIGHT MECHANISM? van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) <ul><li>A strict interpretation of commoditized ES can be pr...
Free and prior informed consent Efficiency Fairness Balancing act is needed
 
<ul><li>Sellers : </li></ul><ul><li>Communities </li></ul><ul><li>Governments </li></ul><ul><li>Industry </li></ul><ul><l...
 
Initial interest Effective increase in ES Signed contract External investors and regulators: learning curve Learning curve...
WHERE TO WITH PES? <ul><li>Continuing to generate evidence to better engage multiple actors </li></ul><ul><li>2. Relating...
Thank You Sara Namirembe ( [email_address] ) PRESA World Agroforestry Centre http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/N...
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EXAMINING PAYMENTS/REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES : EXPERIENCES FROM PRO-POOR REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN AFRICA ( PRESA )

Published on: Mar 3, 2016
Source: www.slideshare.net


Transcripts - EXAMINING PAYMENTS/REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES : EXPERIENCES FROM PRO-POOR REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN AFRICA ( PRESA )

  • 1. EXAMINING PAYMENTS/REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES : EXPERIENCES FROM PRO-POOR REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN AFRICA ( PRESA ) Sara Namirembe With Meine van Noordwijk Delia Catacutan Leimona Beria
  • 2. PRESA Sites
  • 3. <ul><li>Concepts </li></ul><ul><li>Environmental services </li></ul><ul><li>Biophysical outcomes of proper management of natural resources </li></ul><ul><li>Have considerable impact on human beings and wide natural processes. </li></ul><ul><li>PES (payments or rewards for environmental services) - harnessing market forces to increase positive environmental outcomes. </li></ul>
  • 4. Redirecting development pathways towards environmental integrity Positive incentives are needed to reward rural poor for the envirponmental services they can/do provide
  • 5. PRESA SO FAR: Can watersheds be managed sustainably through negotiated agreements between landowners and potential beneficiaries? <ul><li>RES mechanisms differ from ‘command & control’ </li></ul><ul><li>Conditional : a “performance” basis for the rewards /payments as opposed to entitlement </li></ul><ul><li>Voluntary : engagement of both ES providers and beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through free choice at the individual level </li></ul>Key aspects of RES <ul><ul><li>Realistic : RES schemes based on scientifically sound assessment of relationships of land use changes and ES provision. Feasible </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Pro-poor: RES schemes must consider multiple dimensions of poverty </li></ul></ul>Context Mechanism +
  • 6. REALISTIC <ul><li>RES schemes based on scientifically sound assessment of relationships of land use changes and ES provision. </li></ul><ul><li>Feasible </li></ul><ul><li>Propoor </li></ul>
  • 7. Impacts of land use change - Kapingazi The impact of land use change on water yield is generally low. Scenario Water yield (mm) Surface runoff % Base flow % Base case 846 86 14 Convert tea farms to annual crops 936 84 16 Convert coffee farms to annual crops 864 88 12 Double built up areas 860 86 14
  • 8. Effectiveness of landuse practices on hydrology Quantity: Soil and water conservation practices have little effect on water yield Quality: Significant effect on sediment yield Sasumua Landuse practices Sediment yield reduction (%) Reduction in surface runoff (%) Increase in base flow (%) Contour farming with trees 49 16 8 Grass filter strips 38 - - Grass waterway 41 - - Terraces 85 22 10
  • 9. Towards a business case for PWS - Sasumua <ul><li>Grassed waterway (3m width by 20 km length - approx 15 acres) </li></ul>Benefit to Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Cooperation Reduction in cost of alum: Reduction in costs of desiltation of dam <ul><li>Cost to 500 households </li></ul><ul><li>Year 1 : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Land Annual lease </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Labour and grass </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Year 2 onwards: </li></ul>Net annual earning per household: 1,725,000 283,200 (Values in Kenya Shillings) 20% less sediment yield into Sasumua dam 566.4 400,000
  • 10. Pay-back period based on constant cost of allum alone
  • 11. Increasing value accruing to farmers <ul><li>Alternative payment mechanisms - Ulugurus </li></ul><ul><li>Co-investment preferred - village infrastructure </li></ul><ul><li>Group payments – not likely to be successful </li></ul><ul><li>Exploiting other income flows from sustainable watershed management: </li></ul><ul><li>Carbon : </li></ul><ul><li>Albertine Rift: in River Mubuku watershed </li></ul><ul><li>Usambaras : REDD feasibility in Sigi River watershed </li></ul><ul><li>Eco-certification </li></ul><ul><li>Albertine Rift of crafts and honey </li></ul><ul><li>Biodiversity : </li></ul><ul><li>Fouta Djallon </li></ul>Ulugurus Mts, Tanzania
  • 12. Sediment sources in Sasumua <ul><li>Low erosion rates from the forest </li></ul><ul><li>High rates on some agricultural areas, exceeding 11.2 tons/ha per year </li></ul>Reducing costs: targeting hotspots
  • 13. VOLUNTARY <ul><li>Both ES providers and beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through free choice at the individual level </li></ul>
  • 14. Are sellers willing to accept payments for ES supply? <ul><li>Farmers willing to accept (WTA) payments for: </li></ul><ul><li>Adopting agroforestry and other soil and water conservation actions </li></ul><ul><li>enhancing water quality </li></ul>BUT may underestimate opportunity costs $93/ha/y compared to model estimate of $232/ha/y ( Kapingazi) <ul><li>IF ( Ulugurus ): </li></ul><ul><li>Not located in the main villages/towns </li></ul><ul><li>They own sufficient assets - livestock </li></ul>
  • 15. <ul><li>Nairobi water users - 2 o beneficiaries </li></ul><ul><li>Willing to pay higher water tariffs </li></ul><ul><li>Interested in increased and regular flow </li></ul>Are buyers willing to pay for ES? <ul><li>Nairobi Water and Sewerage Cooperation - 1 o beneficiary </li></ul><ul><li>Burdened with multiple levies: </li></ul><ul><li>Water Act demands abstraction fee of 50cts/m 3 (Approx KS 1m/month) to WRMA for watershed mgt. </li></ul><ul><li>Not authorised to increase water tariffs </li></ul><ul><li>Governance - Inadequate management </li></ul>
  • 16. CONDITIONALITY <ul><li>Performance-based rewards </li></ul>
  • 17. If performance will not happen without incentives <ul><li>PROVIDERS </li></ul><ul><li>1. Performance is driven by – </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Perceived value of interventions at household level </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Perceived value of capacity gained </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>NOT recurrent payments </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Ulugurus : Prototype payments, one year </li></ul><ul><li>Upper Tana: UTZ coffee certification, 9 years </li></ul><ul><li>Risk of a crowding-out effect - Usambaras </li></ul>BENEFICIARIES Short run: payments for effort based on trust – CSR Long run: rigorous proof needed Western Usambaras, Tanzania
  • 18. PES Paradigms Conditionality <ul><li>CES: C ommoditized E nvironmental S ervices </li></ul><ul><li>Direct interaction of ES providers & beneficiaries </li></ul><ul><li>Recurrent monetary payments based on supply and demand </li></ul><ul><li>No explicit poverty target </li></ul><ul><li>Actual ES delivery & direct marketability </li></ul><ul><li>COS: C ompensating for O pportunities S kipped </li></ul><ul><li>Paying for accepting restrictions </li></ul><ul><li>Achievement of a condition or effort </li></ul><ul><li>Poverty target added with certain conditions </li></ul><ul><li>CIS: C o- I nvestment in (landscape) S tewardship </li></ul><ul><li>Entrusting resource management to local </li></ul><ul><li>Full trust of management plan & local monitoring with high social capital </li></ul><ul><li>flexible contract , broad sanctions </li></ul>van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) Proxies, recurrent Plans investment 'Real' ES, recurrent
  • 19. WHAT IS THE RIGHT MECHANISM? van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) <ul><li>A strict interpretation of commoditized ES can be problematic. </li></ul><ul><li>Monetary incentives may be counterproductive </li></ul><ul><ul><li>undermine existing norms </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>not sufficient and/or durable enough </li></ul></ul><ul><li>“ Co-investment” in stead of “payment” appeals to both social and financial concepts. </li></ul>CO-INVESTMENT AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ENTAIL <ul><ul><li>respect </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>mutual accountability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>commitment to sustainable development </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>social exchange rather than financial transactions. </li></ul></ul>
  • 20. Free and prior informed consent Efficiency Fairness Balancing act is needed
  • 22. <ul><li>Sellers : </li></ul><ul><li>Communities </li></ul><ul><li>Governments </li></ul><ul><li>Industry </li></ul><ul><li>Large-scale investors </li></ul>Buyers : Local & international companies Banks Governments Individuals Intermediaries : Regulators Brokers Project developers e.g., NGOs Researchers
  • 24. Initial interest Effective increase in ES Signed contract External investors and regulators: learning curve Learning curve for local stakeholders (actors) of land use change Smooth implemen- tation? Efficient + Fair reward systems require a two-way learning curve Negotiations
  • 25. WHERE TO WITH PES? <ul><li>Continuing to generate evidence to better engage multiple actors </li></ul><ul><li>2. Relating to financial mechanisms at national scale. Examining </li></ul><ul><ul><li>context where CES-COS-CIS apply </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>effectiveness/viability of private sector market-driven versus fund approach </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>the business case for publically funded PES </li></ul></ul><ul><li>3. Examining aspects of scale and thresholds for ES supply </li></ul><ul><li>4. Contributing to the carbon agenda: stocks and fluxes, leakage, adaptation, co-benefits </li></ul><ul><li>5. Linking P/RES into food security and broader ICRAF programs such as: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Evergreen Agriculture including grasslands/Drylands </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Millennium Development Goals </li></ul></ul>
  • 26. Thank You Sara Namirembe ( [email_address] ) PRESA World Agroforestry Centre http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Networks/RUPES http://presa.worldagroforestry.org

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